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The American telecommunications industry is in a turbulent transition,
whose outcome is still far from clear. Amidst all the controversy over de-
regulation, the overwhelming majority of transactions in telecommunica-
tions markets still take place at regulated prices. In actuality, what the
industry has been experiencing is an uneven and often uncoordinated se-
ries of movements in the direction of outright deregulation of some mar-
kets and less comprehensive regulation of others.
Both the transition and our ability to predict its ultimate outcome have
been especially complicated by the tendency to deregulate entry while con-
tinuing to regulate the prices of incumbent suppliers. The retention of
price controls was certainly politically inevitable, in view of the wide
range of social goals and interest groups served by the existing regulatory
regime. It was also probably desirable: it has seemed only prudent to con-
tinue to control the prices charged by putative monopolists until markets
show themselves capable of effective competition.
The supposedly transitional retention of regulation-involving both
price ceilings and floors-may, however, thwart achievement of a rational
institutional structure for this industry. This is true whether that arrange-
ment is largely competitive and no longer subject to traditional public-
utility style regulation (as we believe likely) or retains a large component
of regulated public utility monopoly. The retention of price ceilings, be-
cause of the perceived need to prevent the exploitation of residual monop-
oly power, may prevent the closer alignment of prices and costs that is
necessary if competition is to function; and the prescription of minimum
prices for the incumbent companies, by artificially protecting their com-
petitors, obstructs the discovery of whether true competition is really
viable.
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As a result, we simply do not know whether large parts of the business
may really be natural monopolies.' This is certainly not the case so far as
the equipment that subscribers attach to the end of the telephone line is
concerned-the phone instruments themselves, interior wiring, answering
machines, switchboards (PBXs), and computers. In contrast, it is by no
means clear to what extent the competition now prevailing in the long-
distance business is merely the result of the artificial pricing and other
handicaps still imposed on AT&T and its successor companies.' The same
uncertainty extends to the competitive bypassing of the local telephone
companies and the competitive provision of the equivalent of local service
by geographically concentrated business users, such as in the shared ten-
ant services provided in "smart buildings."
So the makers of telecommunications policy confront something of a
dilemma: most of them are unwilling to deregulate completely until they
are confident that the markets are capable of being truly competitive; but
they are unlikely to be able to find out unless they deregulate.
The other major reason for the turbulence of the transition and the
uncertainty about its ultimate result is that regulation has historically set
prices in part on the basis of political considerations-indeed, some ob-
servers have argued that is its raison d'etres-rather than in accordance
with the purely economic considerations that would govern in a competi-
tive market. When entry is effectively controlled, it is possible to sustain
1. For an excellent survey of conflicting viewpoints on the natural monopoly question, see J.
HARING, IMPI.ICATIONS OF ASYMMETRIC REGULATION FOR COMPETITION POLICY ANALYSIS (Fed-
eral Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 14, 1984). Even
some of us who have opposed the efforts of the Bell System to preserve its monopoly have expressed
uncertainty about the viability of competition in long-distance communications, where entry has been
substantially deregulated but pricing has not. See Domestic Telecommunications Common Carrier
Policies, Part 1: Hearings on the Communications Act of 1934, Revisited, Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (statement of Alfred E.
Kahn). John R. Meyer et al. recognize that this service is subject to greater scale economies than the
industry as a whole. J. MEYER, R. WILSoN, M. BAUC.HCUM, E. BURTON & L. CAOUETE, THE
ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TEI.ECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 147 (1980). David S. Ev-
ans and James J. Heckman statistically tested whether the Bell System was a natural monopoly, and
concluded it was not. Evans & Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an
Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615 (1984).
2. See Selwyn & Kravtin, Long-Run Regulation of AT&T: A Key Element of a Competitive
Telecommunications Policy, TELEMATiCS, Aug. 1984, at 11-15, and the Joint Petition to the FCC by
GTE Sprint, Allnet Communications, and U.S. Telecom (RM-5057, June 17, 1985), both arguing a
continued need for regulatory restrictions on AT&T Communications and other preferences for its
smaller competitors if any of them are to survive. For a powerful opposing argument, see J. HARING,
THE FCC, THE OCCs, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF AFFECTION (Federal Communications Commis-
sion Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper No. 17, 1985). See also MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing
by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 249-53,
257-61 (1985) (asserting that continued regulation of AT&T and restrictions preventing the BOCs
from entering the market have sheltered other common carriers from competition).
3. See, e.g., Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971) (arguing
that the main historical reason for regulation has been the desire to practice internal subsidization).
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uneconomic price structures, setting some prices artificially high and
insisting that the resulting profits be used to hold other prices below cost.
The most important examples of this practice in telephony have been the
overpricing of toll calls in order to keep the price of basic service low, and
discrimination against business in favor of residential customers.
As regulatory barriers to entry have been relaxed, however, competitors
have, naturally, flocked into the exploited markets, thereby threatening to
dry up the profits used to hold down basic residential rates." This has in
turn generated political opposition to continued deregulation and a search
for alternative ways of preserving that contribution.
We do not attempt in this Article to resolve the ultimate question of the
proper institutional structure of telecommunications.' Our purpose is,
rather, to contribute to a resolution of the dilemmas created by partial
deregulation, by suggesting solutions to a number of complex and hotly
contested issues of regulatory policy that have been raised or enormously
exacerbated by these changes. The solutions we suggest would be consis-
tent with either ultimate outcome-an essentially deregulated, competitive
industry or thoroughly regulated monopoly, or some combination of the
two. The key is economic efficiency: regulatory decisions consistent with
that goal will not distort the process of deregulation or of ascertaining
whether a deregulated, competitive regime is indeed feasible. Where effi-
ciency conflicts with other social goals, we suggest ways of achieving the
latter with minimum sacrifice of the former.
In Part I, we describe the major distortions in the pricing of telecom-
munications services that continue to be preserved by regulation, identify
the principal issues created by the clash between those distortions and
partial deregulation, and expose their common source: the pervasive pres-
ence of common products and common costs. In Part II, we dispose of a
number of fallacious, pseudo-economic justifications that continue to be
offered for the present structure of prices. This is the easy part of the task.
Many of the disagreements, however, stem from conflicting notions about
4. For an illuminating historical account and analysis of the ways in which the various steps in
the process of opening telecommunications to competitive entry constrained the pricing of the incum-
bent companies, see G, BROCK, TELEPHONE PRICING TO PROMOTE UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND Eco-
NOMIC FREEIX)M (Federal Communications Commission Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper
No. 18, 1986).
5. The most obvious of these revolve around the dismemberment of AT&T, under the Modified
Final Judgment (MFJ) entered in 1982 and effective January 1, 1984, and the continued regulation
and restrictions on the permissible activities of the successor companies by both the District Court,
under the MFJ, and the FCC, aimed at preventing unfair competition and exploitation of captive
customers. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff d, 460
U.S. 1241 (1983). Ultimately, they involve the question of whether, when, and in what ways deregu-
lation may best be brought to a logical conclusion. For a suggestion that the mixture of the two may
be the worst of both possible worlds, see Kahn, The Uneasy Marriage of Regulation and Competi-
tion, TE.EMAIICS, Sept. 1984, at 1-2, 7-17.
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the costs of the various services; Part III examines these factual issues,
which are more difficult to evaluate because they involve assertions about
the design of the telecommunications network, some of which are beyond
our competence to resolve. In Parts IV and V, however, we present-and
to the extent we can, apply-the economic principles pertinent to the reso-
lution of those and other major current issues of telephone pricing.
I. Regulatory Distortions and the Allocation of Common Costs
At the core of almost all the pricing issues in telecommunications is the
fact that the products of this industry are a large and increasing diversity
of services issuing from common facilities. While telecommunications is by
no means unique among the public utilities in this respect,6 the problem is
much more pervasive and central here than in the others. Whereas a
kilowatt-hour of electricity is a kilowatt-hour and a cubic foot of gas a
cubic foot (this is by no means to ignore the fact that a kilowatt hour or
cubic foot supplied at one time of day on a firm basis is not the same
service as at another time on an interruptible basis), telephone service is
an array of services, decreasingly standardized over time, and therefore
less and less susceptible to traditional regulatory treatment. Since regula-
tors and economists generally accept the desirability of basing the prices of
these services on their respective costs, the issues tend to be framed in
terms of the proper apportionment of their common costs among them, a
task further complicated by the fact that some of the services have become
subject to competition, while others continue to be offered by a single sup-
plier, under close regulati.n.
Under the historic process for apportioning the costs of the telephone
companies between intrastate and interstate regulatory jurisdictions
(known as "separations"), an ever-increasing portion of the cost of merely
linking subscribers to the communications network has been recovered in
the charges for long distance calls, and used principally to hold down the
basic monthly charge to residential customers. The states generally fol-
lowed a similar practice in pricing toll calls within their borders. Since the
cost of connecting subscribers was widely believed to be "non-traffic-
sensitive" (NTS)7 and therefore not part of the marginal cost of calling,
its transfer to toll violated the most elementary principle of efficient pric-
ing.8 Still, by loading on to long-distance callers costs that have reached a
6. See I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 77-83 (1970) (discussing services emanat-
ing from common facilities of public utilities, river valley development projects, and industries includ-
ing oil and gas, airlines, and railroads).
7. We discuss recent contradictions of this factual assumption in Part III.
8. Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, I YALE J. ON REG. 139, 143 (1984).
For fuller descriptions of the history of separations, see R. GABEL, DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATIONS
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peak of something like eleven billion dollars annually, the transfer made a
major contribution9 to the fifty-five percent decline in real terms in the
price of basic service between 1940 and 1980.10 And that in turn helped
raise the proportion of households subscribing to telephone service from
thirty-seven percent in 1940 to the present level of more than ninety-two
percent."
Most state regulators opposed deregulation, recognizing that if the bar-
riers to entering the overpriced markets were removed, competition would
erode the monopolistic margins producing that multi-billion dollar contri-
bution to local rates.1 2 And as deregulation of entry into long-distance
communications has nevertheless proceeded, they and Congress have suc-
cessfully insisted on perpetuation of the contribution, which now takes the
form of a charge by the local telephone companies to all long-distance
carriers for access to the local networks, which the latter companies re-
quire in order to originate and terminate calls.1
The fears of the state regulators have nevertheless been partially
realized: between January 1980 and November 1986, the local telephone
charges component of the Consumer Price Index rose 31.6% in real terms,
while the price of interstate toll service decreased 28.5%."'
PRINCIPLES IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1967). For the most recent developments, see Fowler,
Halprin & Schlichting, "Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM.
L.J. 145 (1986).
9. The eleven billion dollar figure includes an estimate of the contribution from intrastate as well
as interstate toll. We refrain from characterizing this transfer of costs as a "subsidy," even though that
clearly has been its purpose, because that term is susceptible to a variety of definitions, and it is not
clear that the practice we describe here satisfies all of them. See generally N. Cornell & R. Noll,
Local Telephone Prices and the Subsidy Question (Oct. 21, 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the authors) (examining validity of general assumption that basic service is subsidized). On the
uncertainty about whether the transfer of costs meets one widely used test, see infra note 76.
10. The figures in current dollars are from AT&T ECONOMIC ANA.YSIS SECTION, RELATIVE
CosTS OF TELEPHONE SERVICE 1940-1980 (1980).
11. The 1940 figure is from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAI. ABSTRACr OF THE U.S. 495 (90th ed. 1969). The 1986 figure is from TELECOMM. REP.,
June 2, 1986, at 6. Because of a change in the question posed to households, we are informed, the two
ratios are not strictly comparable, and the comparable 1986 figure would probably be substantially
higher than 92%.
12. On issues of communications deregulation, the votes of the Executive Committee of the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), of which one of us was a member,
typically ran on the order of 90% to 95% in opposition. On the position of NARUC, see Kahn &
Zielinski, New Rate Structures in Communications, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 25, 1976, at 23.
13. The telephone companies impose a second charge on those carriers that is intended to recover
what are classified in the FCC accounts as the traffic-sensitive costs of providing access. Some portion
of these charges, as well, appears to be recovering costs (principally of terminating the dedicated
subscriber lines in the central office) that are actually NTS. Our discussion in the text, in any event,
relates to the recovery of costs of the local exchange network that are believed not to vary with the
amount of calling, and are so treated in the FCC accounts.
14. Most of this divergence took place after January 1, 1984, the effective date of the AT&T
breakup. Between January 1980 and December 1983, local charges went up 4.4% and interstate long
distance charges dropped 6.5%. Between the latter date and November 1986 the respective charges
were up 26.1% and down 23.5% (all figures in real terms). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU
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This recent divergence between local and toll rates is apparently ex-
plained less by the direct functioning of competitive market forces-since
rates continue to be regulated 16-than by the Federal Communication
Commission's (FCC) recognition (and, in varying degree, by the state
commissions') of the inevitable direction of those forces. Alarmed by the
growing tendency of large users of long-distance services on the one side
and interexchange carriers on the other to bypass the facilities of the local
telephone companies, in order to evade those inflated access charges,16 the
Commission determined to reverse the long trend of interstate separations.
It therefore proposed gradually to transfer those putatively NTS costs
back to the subscriber, in the form of a universal flat monthly "interstate
access" or "subscriber line charge"1 7 rising by one dollar each year over a
five- to seven-year period. Not surprisingly, that decision evoked violent
OF LABOR STATISTIS, CPI DETAILED REPORT, table S, January 1980, January 1984, November
1986.
The reductions in long distance rates by AT&T Communications alone between May 1984 and
June 1986 amounted to approximately 25% in constant dollars. TELECOMM. REP., June 2, 1986, at 7.
Another cut of 11% (in undeflated dollars) went into effect on January 1, 1987. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
31, 1986, at D3, col. 5.
The local telephone charges component of the CPI includes the subscriber line charge or access fee
that, as we point out infra at text accompanying note 17, the FCC has imposed technically not for
"local service" but for "interstate access." The fact remains that it is the increase in the basic monthly
charge that the state regulators and consumerists feared and opposed, and the FCC's fee has contrib-
uted to the realization of those fears.
15. The rates charged by the long distance carriers other than AT&T (the "other common carri-
ers" or OCCs) are unregulated, but the long-distance rates of AT&T and, in most states, of the Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs), and sometimes of the OCCs within the "local access and transport
areas" or LATAs (to which the BO" 's have been confined by the Modification of Final Judgment in
the AT&T antitrust case, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982), affid, 460 U.S. 1241 (1983)), as well as essentially all local telephone rates continue under full
regulation.
16. See MTS/WATS Market Structure, 93 F.C.C. 2d 241 app. F (1983), as well as the second
study of the phenomenon by the FCC's COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, BYPASS OF THE PUBLIC
SWITCHED NETWORK (Dec. 19, 1984), cited in Fowler, Halprin & Schlicting, supra note 8, at 180
n.99. Bypass has occurred in two ways. "Facilities bypass" circumvents the facilities of the local
company through totally private communications systems or through direct terrestrial or microwave
links between users and long distance carriers. "Service bypass" avoids the overcharged switched ac-
cess service by leasing from the local companies private, dedicated lines, the rates for which do not
include any of those assumedly non-traffic-sensitive costs. See also C. Jackson & J. Rohlfs, Improving
the Economic Efficiency of NTS Cost Recovery 11 (September 1986) (unpublished manuscript availa-
ble from Shooshan & Jackson Inc., Washington, D.C.) (projecting that under current access charges,
local exchange carriers will by 1990 lose 47% of their current NTS usage revenues because of bypass,
special access, and WATS).
17. As one of us observed at the time, the FCC's effort by that designation to sugar-coat the
economically sensible but politically perilous transfer of these costs from long-distance rates to a flat
monthly subscriber charge merely invited the complaint, "I don't make any long-distance calls; why
then should I have to pay for interstate access?" The only legitimate response, that there is in fact no
economically feasible way of differentiating interstate access from local access or from having tele-
phone service at all (see infra Part III), would invite the rejoinder, "If there is no such thing as
interstate access, why are you proposing to charge me for it?" Kahn, Concluding Comments: The
Future of Access, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACCESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 249 (A. Baughcum & G.
Faulhaber eds. 1984).
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opposition from consumer advocacy groups, state regulators, and
Congress, which forced the FCC to compromise. It responded by freezing
the percentage of the NTS costs to be recovered from interstate usage and
increasing the subscriber access fee only to one dollar and then two dollars
(the latter effective June 1, 1986) for residential service, and up to six
dollars per line for multi-line business service. 8
The job of conforming rate structures to the dictates of competition and
economic efficiency is therefore still far from completed. 9 An estimated
eleven billion dollars per year of revenue requirements labelled non-
traffic-sensitive are still being collected from long-distance calling, by in-
corporation in the access charges to interexchange carriers and in the in-
trastate toll charges by the state utility commissions." Long-distance rates
therefore are still apparently many times incremental costs,2 ' and the
18. The six dollars is a maximum. If the cost allocated to the interstate jurisdiction-which varies
among telephone companies-comes to less than six dollars, the "interstate access" charge is set at
that lower level.
19. We recognize that the typical injunction on regulators to set rates at "just and reasonable"
levels does not constitute an undiluted endorsement of economic efficiency as their only proper goal.
See, e.g., E. ZAJAK, FAIRNI-.S OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUcrION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING 59
(1978) (outlining problem of balancing equity and efficiency with public utility pricing as its focus).
We proceed, however, on the premise, which we believe to be unexceptionable, that an overriding goal
of economic efficiency is in fact the inescapable implication of deregulation-which consists in essence
in substituting competition for regulation as the determiner of price and the other dimensions of
economic performance. This does not preclude specific governmental interventions in the interest of
other social values, but it does suggest-and we accept-that those interventions should be as undis-
ruptive as possible of competition and of economic efficiency.
20. Moreover, the eleven billion dollar estimate does not include the portion of costs labelled TS
that are actually NTS. See supra note 13. The reason for the stubborn refusal of the interstate bur-
den-some two-thirds of the eleven billion dollars-to decline in absolute terms, despite the transfer of
approximately 3.8 billion dollars to direct charges on subscribers, is, principally, that the frozen per-
centage allocation to the interstate jurisdiction (a nationwide average of approximately 28%, scheduled
to move to a uniform 25% within eight years) is applied to a total that grows from year to year.
Fortunately, since the number of minutes of interstate calling has been growing even more rapidly,
the roughly constant aggregate amount has translated since 1984 into a declining markup per min-
ute-roughly from 9.4 to 5,9 cents, effective January 1987, for the origination plus the termination of
calls (observe that each call is subject to access charges by both the originating and the terminating
local telephone company). This sharp reduction has been made possible partly by an exogenous fac-
tor-the decline in the cost of capital. Another important contributor, however, has been the response
of demand to falling long-distance rates, and this is exactly what economic efficiency required.
The termination charge has fallen only from 4.71 to 4.33 cents, while the origination charge has
fallen from 4.71 to 1.55 cents. TEI.ECoMM. REP., Oct. 6, 1986, at 5, 33; TELECOMM. REP., Jan. 8,
1987, at 2-3. The reason the FCC has decided to concentrate most of the reduction on the latter
charge has been its perception that the danger of bypass by large users is greater at the origination
end. But a mail order firm, for example, would have a strong incentive to bypass the termination
charge, for obvious reasons.
21. See, e.g., L. Perl, Impacts of Local Measured Service in South Central Bell's Service Area in
Kentucky 24 (May 21, 1985) [hereinafter L. Perl, LMS in Kentuckyl (prepared by National Eco-
nomic Research Associates for South Central Bell Telephone Company) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the authors). This study, which is limited to Kentucky, suggests that intrastate rates are more
than four times and interstate rates three times their respective incremental costs. Southwest Bell
estimated its average incremental costs for intrastate inter-LATA calls in Oklahoma at 5.9 cents per
minute in 1984; the corresponding average rate was 34.9 cents-a ratio of almost six to one. See also
Development of Intrastate Access Charges: Hearings on Cause 28309 Before the Corporation
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same is true of local calls where they are measured and charged for sepa-
rately.2" In a compromise, a joint board of state regulators and FCC
members recommended resuming the FCC's intended transfer of the bur-
den of NTS costs, by further increasing the flat "interstate access" charge
on residential subscribers in three steps from its present two dollars to
three and a half dollars monthly by April 1989-promptly eliciting indig-
nant protests from consumerists and legislators."3 And the FCC on July 2,
1986 announced yet another new comprehensive review of the entire ac-
cess charge question.2 '
Manifestly, while the relaxation of entry restrictions has limited the
range of regulators' discretion over prices, it has not eliminated it. The
consequence has been to hamper the transition to complete deregulation,
and to deprive us so far of a fair test of whether a deregulated telecommu-
nications industry will work.
The consequence has also been to leave most of the central issues of
telephone pricing still very hotly contested. All have at their core the ques-
tion of the proper recovery of costs common to the provision of a variety of
telephone services:
* The contention that (a) providing subscribers with mere access to the
telephone network, (b) local calling, and (c) long distance calling are joint
products, and therefore do not have separate, objectively identifiable costs;
e The question of whether subscriber access-merely putting subscribers
in a position to place and receive calls-is a separate service, which
should therefore be chargcL for separately;
* The contention that a subscriber access network suitable for long dis-
tance calling is more expensive to construct than one designed for local
calling only;
- The question of whether customer access becomes more costly to provide
when it is used heavily-whether for local or long-distance calling;
Comm'n of the State of Oklahoma (June 1, 1985) (statement of Alfred E. Kahn at 7-8) [hereinafter
Kahn Oklahoma Testimony]. A New England Telephone Company study estimated the marginal cost
of intra-LATA toll calls at 2.0 cents per minute on-peak; the charges averaged 22.6 cents per minute.
L. Perl, Can Marginal Costs be Measured 12 (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors).
22. See infra note 140.
23. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1987, at 1, col 2. Of course, imposition of this charge by the Federal
regulators does not ensure more efficient pricing: the state regulators are free to offset it by reducing
the portion of the basic charge under their control correspondingly and making up the deficiency by
increasing other rates-for example, intrastate toll or for local calls. It appears, however, that in
general they have not done so.
24. T.ECOMM. REP., July 7, 1986, at 1-2.
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9 The claims that the telephone companies are inefficiently designing their
systems in a way that inflates the marginal costs of subscriber access;
* The controversies over whether the telephone companies are overinvest-
ing in modern technology-notably digital switching and fiber-optic
transmission-in order to be able to provide newer and more versatile
services that are of no interest to people who want only plain old tele-
phone service (POTS), and are trying illegitimately to impose some por-
tion of the costs on them;
* The question of whether subscriber access and local calling should be
priced separately or offered only bundled, in the form of flat rate local
service;
* The fairness of burdening captive POTS customers today with deprecia-
tion charges inflated by the increasingly intense competition to which the
telephone companies have been subjected in the provision of other services,
and with the other carrying costs of sunk investments left stranded by that
competition.
Some of these issues involve empirical questions to which we are not
able to offer definitive answers. We lack sufficient information to judge,
for example, whether the companies' investment decisions are or have
been either prudent, in the technical regulatory sense, or efficient. Nor do
we attempt to judge the comparative equities of having the heavy sunk
costs associated with past investments borne by stockholders on the one
side or captive customers on the other. In these cases all we can do is
elucidate the pertinent economic and regulatory principles.
Finally, while we do not attempt in this Article to provide solutions to
the institutional issues of telecommunications policy, it seems to us that
current efforts to deregulate some commonly provided services totally
while continuing to regulate others encounter problems that have no satis-
factory solution within the framework of conventional regulation. As we
will show, given the pervasiveness and centrality of common costs, this
effort tempts regulatory commissions to engage in economically illegiti-
mate cost allocations and second-guessing of company investment decisions
in ways that are fundamentally incompatible with both competition and
economic efficiency. So long as regulation of POTS for households and
small businesses continues to be necessary, the only logical solution, ulti-
mately, is total deregulation of the other services and total separation of
their revenues and the costs assigned to them from the rates that continue
to require regulatory attention.
Yale Journal on Regulation
II. Six Pricing Fallacies
It is a sign of the effectiveness of a market economy that if there is a
demand that is capable of being satisfied on acceptable terms, the supply
will be forthcoming. So it has been with the avid demand for purportedly
economic rationalizations of the present structure of telephone company
prices; they have appeared in a profusion, with a versatility and resource-
fulness, that cannot fail to inspire admiration." Typically they involve
some combination of the following assertions:
1. The access component of basic service is not itself a service, but sim-
ply a means of enabling customers to make local and long-distance calls;
2. In a competitive market, customers are never charged separately for
"access"-that is, the mere opportunity to buy particular goods and
services;
3. Identifying the separate cost of access is impossible, because access
and telephone calls are joint products;
4. Since long-distance callers and carriers benefit from (and depend
upon) the lines linking customers to their telephone central offices, they
should pay part of those access costs;
5. Failure to charge these beneficiaries would give them a "free ride"
on the facilities, and competitive markets do not give free rides;
6. It is unimportant how the costs of access are recovered because tele-
phone pricing is a "zero sum game."
All of these propositions are economically fallacious. Yet they must
have a superficial plausibility: they are presented in rate case after rate
case, with a regularity that would be hard to explain if they always fell on
deaf ears. For this reason only, each requires careful scrutiny. 6
A. The First Fallacy: Customer Access is Not a Service
Customers have to be connected with the telephone network if they are
to place or receive telephone calls. This is usually accomplished by a
physical link between their premises and a switch at a nearby central
25. We make no effort to provide a systematic attribution of these views to particular individuals:
it is the ideas themselves whose fallaciousness we seek to expose. We have encountered some or all of
them, from various witnesses, in every state regulatory proceeding involving telephone pricing with
which we have come into contact.
26. In view of the adversarial, politically charged character of the regulatory process, we disclose
that we have offered testimony on behalf of both Bell Operating Companies and AT&T along some
of the lines of argument that follow.
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office, which has the capability of routing calls to their intended destina-
tions. The connection is commonly referred to as access. 7
The argument we examine here is that (a) access is merely a prerequi-
site to placing and receiving calls, (b) the cost of providing it is therefore
properly regarded as part of the cost of telephone calls, and (c) that cost
should therefore be recovered partly in the charge for local calls, partly in
the price of toll calls.
The assertion that customer access is not a service, but instead merely a
prerequisite to the provision of "real" telephone services, is in itself
merely semantic. But the inferences drawn from it are fallacious. The
defining characteristic of a service is that it is or would be demanded in its
own right. By that criterion, access is clearly a service. Even if most cus-
tomers were not interested in it in order to place calls, many would want
it if only to receive calls. And even if they had no specific expectation of
placing or receiving calls, many would still be willing to pay for the op-
portunity to do so, when and if the occasion arose.
The important question is in any event not semantic but economic:
whether or not access is labelled a "service," what is the efficient way of
recovering its costs? Specifically, is it desirable to recover the costs of pro-
viding subscribers with the opportunity to place or receive calls, whether
or not they actually do so, in a flat monthly charge, or in charges for
usage? That is the only relevant economic question.
And that question breaks down into two others. First, does subscriber
access have a separate identifiable incremental cost associated causally
with providing it? The answer is, unquestionably, yes. Connecting a cus-
tomer to the network uses scarce resources, even if he or she never uses
the connection. The customer who subscribes to two access lines imposes a
greater cost on the system than the customer who subscribes to one, even
if they make the same number of calls, at the same times and places.
Second, does charging for access separately serve a purpose? The an-
swer is that it serves the very important purpose of economic efficiency if
buyers are confronted, in each of their purchase decisions, with prices that
reflect the respective incremental costs to society of their taking more or
less of each available good and service or, to put it another way, what
costs society would save if they took less of each.
27. It is also referred to as customer or subscriber access, to distinguish it from "carrier access."
Although, so far as the link between subscriber and central office is concerned, the two are different
ways of looking at the same thing-the same network that gives subscribers access, via the switch at
their local telephone company office, to long-distance carriers obviously gives the carriers access to
them-the distinction becomes significant when it comes to the hotly contested issue of how the tele-
phone company should recover the costs of that network: in "access" charges to the carriers or in the
basic monthly charge to subscribers.
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It would serve no purpose to charge for access and usage separately if
subscribers always purchased them in fixed proportions: it would not
make any difference in those circumstances whether the combined incre-
mental costs were distributed between the two services in separate prices
or incorporated in a single price. The fact is, however, that subscribers
use their access facilities in widely varying amounts and patterns; in those
circumstances economic efficiency demands that they be confronted with
prices for those several services corresponding as closely as possible to
their respective marginal costs.
Using the price of telephone calls to recover access costs that do not in
fact vary as more or fewer calls are made therefore induces wasteful
choices by customers. It encourages them to order underpriced access lines
that they value less than the incremental costs to society of providing the
lines, 8 and it discourages them from making overpriced calls whose value
to them would have exceeded the incremental cost to society. The same
result would follow if an electric utility were to supply its customers with
all the appliances they wanted at no charge and recovered the costs in the
price of electricity-wasteful overpurchasing of appliances and undercon-
sumption of electricity.
29
B. The Second Fallacy: Access Would Be Free in a Competitive Market
The contention that access is not a service is often followed by an asser-
tion that competitive markets never charge for the mere opportunity to
buy a good or service. 80 "Only a monopoly," one witness has asserted,
''can charge a flat fee on a continuing basis whether you use the service or
not.""'
28. There remains an important factual question of whether, and how much, the transfer to call-
ing of a large portion of the revenue requirements associated with subscriber access, as determined
under traditional regulatory procedures, has resulted in prices of access lines below incremental costs.
See infra, note 76 and Part III. That it has resulted in toll charges far above the marginal costs of toll
calling, however, seems indisputable.
29. In principle, there is a third question: do the benefits of charging separately for access-or any
other service-outweigh the costs of doing so? We consider this when we discuss the efficiency of
introducing local measured service in Part IlI infra. In the present context, however, the question is a
trivial one. The issue here is whether access costs should be recovered in a lump sum charge or in
charges based on usage. There are no costs of administering the former: whether customers are on flat
rate or local measured service, they already pay a flat monthly charge, and that, rather than in
charges for usage, is where economic efficiency requires the cost of access be recovered. The efficiency
of measuring and charging separately for local calling, we will discover, is less clear.
30. See, e.g., Petition Requesting Investigation Concerning the Development of Intrastate Access
Charges: Hearing on Docket P-830452 Before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Aug.
1984) (statement of William H. Melody at 48-53) [hereinafter Melody Testimony]. Melody also
stated the corollary that only a firm with monopoly power can impose "a fixed subscriber access
charge." Id. at 49-50.
31. Application of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company to Restructure Schedule of Rates and
Charges: Hearing on Cause 29321 Before the Corporation Comm. of the State of Oklahoma (Aug.
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These assertions are plainly wrong.
Country clubs charge a flat membership fee as well as separate fees for
the use of facilities to which membership provides access-golf courses,
tennis courts, and restaurants. Restaurants frequently impose minimum or
cover charges, independently of the prices for items ordered from the
menu. Banks and credit card companies impose flat monthly or annual
service charges, along with separate fees based on how much a customer
uses their facilities. And what are long-term leases of residential or com-
mercial space but contracts under which the lessees agree to pay for access
to those facilities fixed rentals that have no relationship to the extent to
which they actually use the premises?
On the other hand, most restaurants in this country do not impose cover
charges. Department stores and supermarkets do not charge admission
fees. Most suburban shopping malls do not charge separately for parking;
but parking lots in cities do.
What distinguishes these various cases? The principal factors seem to
be whether the supplier incurs a cost in providing "mere" access; the size
of those costs relative to the costs and potential revenues associated with
actual use of the facilities; and the size of the lost net revenues resulting
from reduced trade if the supplier charges separately for access-by keep-
ing customers away entirely-relative to the cost of not doing so, which
depends in turn on the extent to which customers might take advantage of
a zero access charge to impose losses on the supplier.
To offer shoppers the opportunity to buy its wares, a department store
must incur the costs of providing space, heat, light, display facilities, and
at least a minimum sales force. It incurs most of these costs regardless of
whether the shoppers buy a great deal or nothing at all. Similarly, a coun-
try club must construct and maintain golf courses and tennis courts to be
able to offer its members the opportunity to play those games; it incurs
these costs even if the facilities are rarely or never used. For most depart-
ment stores, supermarkets and restaurants, however, the costs of providing
mere entry are small compared with the expected revenues from actually
making sales or providing meals. Their profit will come from a heavy
turnover, the variable costs of which will typically be many times the costs
of providing the facility in which the sales are made. In these circum-
stances, imposition of a cover charge or entry fee would, by driving away
1985) (statement of Allen G. Buckalew at 33). Economists have made similar arguments in opposition
to including construction work in progress in a utility company's rate base: "You don't see consumers
in competitive markets being forced to pay for the costs of facilities that do not yet serve them." For
an exposure of the fallacy of this assertion and other related regulatory shibboleths, see In re Illinois
Power Co., Illinois Commerce Comm'n, No. 84-0480 (Apr. 25, 1985) (rebuttal testimony of Alfred
Kahn).
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customers, probably lose them more profits than it would gain them. In
the case of country club golf courses, in contrast, the costs are preponder-
antly independent of usage or turnover. The same is obviously true of
providing apartments and offices for rental.
Exactly the same calculations that induce most restaurants not to im-
pose cover charges or minimum bills will often lead richly appointed
restaurants, and particularly ones that offer entertainment, to do so. If
they did not, they might well be filled up with patrons who order only a
cup of coffee and remain at their tables for hours. The costs of providing
mere access in the last case are heavily inflated by opportunity cost: since
the space is limited, admitting freeloaders without charge results in large
losses of net revenues from the customers that they crowd out.
In suburban shopping malls, the costs of providing parking spaces are
quite low compared with the sales revenues of their various shops; and,
since customers will rarely use the free parking for purposes other than
making purchases in the shops, the opportunity costs of non-shoppers
crowding out shoppers are low as well. In these circumstances charges for
parking would, by keeping customers away, probably result in a greater
loss of net revenues by the shops than it would save in the direct and
opportunity costs of providing parking. In cities, in contrast, space is
scarce and costly, and drivers quickly discover that they can use a bank's
downtown parking lot while shopping elsewhere. So the bank, to avoid
crowding out of its own customers, must develop a system for charging
non-patrons, and excusing patrons of access charges only for a limited
time.
Competition forces companies to price the various services they offer at
their respective costs. If, then, providing "mere" access involves substan-
tial costs-direct or opportunity costs-firms in truly competitive markets
must either charge for it or go out of business. Thus, the assertion that
competitive markets would never charge for access is not merely wrong; it
is in some ways the opposite of the truth. The greater a firm's monopoly
power-its ability to charge above marginal cost for usage-the greater its
ability to offer access at less than cost, in the confident expectation of
recovering the deficiency through usage charges. 8
32. Just as in the practice of tie-in sales, a firm might in this way more effectively exploit its
monopoly power, discriminatorily obtaining larger monopoly profits from customers to whom its ser-
vices were worth more (as measured by their usage) and smaller ones from light users, to whom they
were presumably worth less. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, The Economics of Tie-In Sales, 42 REV. ECON. & STAT. 68 (1960).
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C. The Third Fallacy: Access and Calls are Joint Products
The joint products argument proceeds generally along the following
lines. Since calls cannot be made without access, and/or since the same
subscriber plant provides access for both local and long-distance calling,
the three services are joint products. It is an elementary economic princi-
ple that joint products-wool and mutton being the standard textbook
example-do not have separately identifiable costs. It is therefore simply
not possible in this case to follow the unexceptionable rule, which few
economist witnesses have been so shameless as to reject, of pricing services
at their respective costs. The regulator has no choice, therefore, but to
allocate the joint costs among the services in some "reasonable" way, such
as (1) one-third each to access, local calls, and toll calls, (2) in proportion
to the minutes of use of the network for local and toll calls, (3) on the
basis of the relative values of local and toll calls, or (4) in proportion to
the costs of building hypothetical stand-alone systems for local and long-
distance calling.
This argument, either disingenuous or ignorant, is fallacious from start
to finish, for the simple reason that these telephone services are not joint
products. The foregoing chain of reasoning, which depends entirely upon
that erroneous premise, is therefore irrelevant.
Joint products, as economists use that term, can be produced only in
fixed or unvarying proportions. The traditional examples-wool and mut-
ton, cotton and cottonseed oil-may not be completely realistic (sheep may
be kept alive through a varying number of wool-bearing seasons before
they are slaughtered; and the proportions of wool and mutton can proba-
bly be varied by breeding). But the concept is clear: products that can be
produced only in fixed proportions do not have separately identifiable pro-
duction costs. The cost of bringing a sheep to market is ascertainable, but
how much of that cost is attributable to the wool and how much to the
mutton cannot be said. It is impossible to identify a marginal production
cost of wool and another for mutton: the only one we can identify is for
wool and mutton."3
33. This is not to say that joint products do not have unique economically efficient prices that can
be separately specified. On the contrary, the economically efficient solution to pricing them, as Alfred
Marshall demonstrated clearly a century ago, involves determining the efficient level of supply by
equating the combined prices purchasers will be willing to pay for them to their joint marginal supply
cost and selling those quantities for what each will yield in its market. This has the effect of equating
the price of each to its separate marginal opportunity cost-that is to say, to the value of the last or
least valuable unit to the purchaser next in line excluded by that price. A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES
oF ECONOmICS 389-90 (9th ed. 1961); A. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE 190-94 (1932). See
also Hirshleifer, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment, 72 Q. J. EcON. 451 (1958); 1 A.
KAHN, supra note 6, at 77-83. The efficient prices of joint products, thus, are determined by their
respective demands: they can not and need not be based on separate costs of production.
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Telephone access and local and long-distance calls are not joint prod-
ucts, because they are patently not produced in fixed proportions. 4 Sub-
scribers connected to the telephone network may, both individually and in
the aggregate, make no calls or many; they may place local and long-
distance calls in all conceivable volumes and proportions to one another;
and they do. Each service has a separate, identifiable marginal supply
cost, which can be determined by examining how the telephone company's
costs increase or decrease as, holding the other services constant, customers
order more or fewer access lines or use their access to place more or fewer
local or long-distance calls.
D. The Fourth Fallacy: Costs Should be Distributed on the Basis of
Benefit
Each of the preceding three fallacious contentions typically leads to a
conclusion that the cost of subscriber access should be recovered at least in
part through the prices of local and long-distance calls because the callers
use those facilities and benefit from their availability. Failure to do so
would be objectionable, it is asserted, because that would give the caller a
"free ride.
' '35
Another version of this contention is that the companies providing long-
distance service profit from the existence of a customer access network,
and therefore ought to pay for it. This version is economically illiterate,
because it assumes that toll carriers will not charge customers for the costs
they incur; we return therefore to the preceding assertion about the fair
distribution of access costs among customers.
Economists are not, as such, experts on what is fair and what is not. A
reasonable case could surely be made, however, that there is nothing par-
ticularly fair about charging users of a facility more than the costs that
their use of it imposes on society, or that restraint on their part would
34. Some economists use the term "joint costs" more loosely, to embrace cases in which the prod-
ucts are produced in common but the proportions can be varied. Whatever the possible confusion in
terminology, the significant economic question is whether the products or services in question are or
are not produced in fixed proportions.
35. See, e.g., Melody Testimony, supra note 30, at 13. The placers of long-distance calls would of
course still be paying the costs of providing them with access even if those costs were merely recovered
in their charges for local service alone; but, the contention is, they would not be paying their "fair
share"-one reflecting their assertedly disproportionately great benefit-to the extent they made more
use of that access for long-distance calling than the average subscriber.
The same free rider argument was frequently offered, years ago, by opponents of peak pricing of
utility services: off-peak users, they argued, should be made to bear their "fair share" of the costs of
the facilities that served them. Regulatory commissions today, however, widely recognize the validity
of the opposing consideration-that it is not only inefficient but could be regarded as at least equally
unfair to charge some people more for service and others less than the incremental costs they impose
on the rest of us by taking greater service, respectively, off- and on-peak.
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save it. By that reasoning, it is unfair-as well as blatantly inefficient-to
charge long-distance or local callers much more than the marginal costs of
such usage.
Least defensible of all has been the effort of some economists, conceding
the economic desirability of basing prices on "cost" (though, for obvious
reasons, rarely adding the adjective "marginal"), to justify the allocation
of a large portion of the putatively non-traffic-sensitive costs of subscriber
plant to long-distance calling-whether on the basis of benefit, value, or
usage.
Let us speak plainly about this kind of reasoning. The only costs that
have objective reality are ones that describe a causal relationship between
the act of purchase and their incurrence. Cost allocations that are not
grounded in causality have no basis in objective reality; they have no
meaning independent of the prices they are supposed to justify, except in
some ritualistic, incantational sense. Allocations of cost on the basis of
benefit or some other conception of fairness are tautological, or teleologi-
cal; they are merely a plausible device for clothing with the appearance of
cost justification some preconceived notion of what the proper price
should be, rather than meaningfully independent tests of the economic
propriety of those prices.
Witnesses who make this sort of argument are not saying: "Usage
causes the company to incur some of these costs; therefore the prices
charged for usage should incorporate those costs," but, instead, "usage
should bear some of these costs; therefore let us allocate some of them to
it." The last part of that sentence adds nothing logically to the first; it is
merely a superficially plausible way of attempting to justify the predeter-
mined result.
E. The Fifth Fallacy: Competitive Markets Do Not Provide Free Rides
We are aware of no economist witnesses in telecommunications regula-
tory proceedings who deny the desirability of regulation emulating the
results that would in unregulated markets be produced by effective compe-
tition. On the contrary, they typically adduce that principle to support
their proposals, arguing, as we have already observed, that one never sees,
for example, competitive markets charging consumers for "mere access" to
facilities or services. Their confident assertion that competitive markets do
not give free rides is equally incorrect.
Butchers still give customers bones for their dogs-"free rides" on the
carcass; woodworking shops will give away wood scraps and sawdust, and
liquor stores their empty cartons-in all cases because (or to the extent
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that) the marginal opportunity costs are zero.3" Since deregulation, com-
petition has forced the airlines to give off-peak travelers, in seats that
would otherwise go out empty, something close to the "free ride" that
some economist witnesses decry in telephone cases. The practice has un-
questionably contributed to improved efficiency in the use of aircraft and
to enhanced economic welfare."
Toll service is not like bones for one's dog or sawdust for the cat; it does
have a marginal cost. But use of a subscriber's access to the local exchange
for the purpose of placing or receiving a toll call is, like those others, a
free good, so long as its costs are truly non-traffic-sensitive: its marginal
cost is zero.
Competition forces prices to marginal costs; to the extent consumers
would have been willing to pay more, the difference is a "consumer sur-
plus" that competition has conferred on them. Only monopolists, govern-
ments, kidnappers, and blackmailers can and do extract that surplus by
regularly charging their "customers" on the basis of benefit or value
rather than marginal costs.
The one kind of cost that we can be certain competitive markets will
ignore is the kind of allocation that attributes to services costs that do not
vary with their supply. Any attempt in a competitive market to hold
prices above the costs causally and directly related to supplying particular
services will be frustrated by competitive entry. That is exactly what has
been happening in long-distance communications, to the extent competi-
tion has been permitted to work its way.
F. The Sixth Fallacy: Telephone Pricing is a Zero-Sum Game
Some commenters have asserted, apparently in all seriousness, that tele-
phone pricing is in any event a "zero-sum game" because whatever we
take off customers' long distance bills, we simply add to their local
charges, in the aggregate. The central conception of economics, on the
contrary, is that moving in the direction of efficient pricing is far from a
zero-sum game. What these observers fail to grasp is that prices below
marginal costs cause a loss in social welfare just as much as prices above
36. These are all joint products, and the zero price in these specific instances is precisely the
efficient solution described supra at note 33. To the extent the examples are not precisely apposite
(many butchers give "free" bones only to regular customers) it is because these may not actually be
free goods in the technical sense-that is, they may not be in such abundant supply as to have zero
opportunity costs.
37. E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES ch. 5 (1985). The
airline fares differ from the others in that, except for true standby services, they are typically offered
only discriminatorily, and thus conduce to "second-best" results rather than "first-best." For a discus-
sion of first- and second-best, see infra Parts IV and V.
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marginal costs. These two inefficiencies do not offset one another; they are
additive.
Various economists have tried to estimate the welfare losses imposed on
all of us, collectively, by the inefficiencies flowing from our present set of
prices for telephone services. While those estimates are subject to a wide
band of error, they run, plausibly, in the billions of dollars annually."
The logic is, as we have already observed, that holding the prices of some
services far above the incremental cost to society of providing them induces
consumers not to make some purchases whose worth to them would have
been greater than their cost to society-that is, than it would have cost
them, since they are society. The difference between those two quantities
represents a net loss in social welfare. Similarly, holding the prices of
other services markedly below marginal cost induces consumers to
purchase incremental quantities that are worth less to them than their
incremental cost to society; that difference represents an additional social
welfare loss.
The loss is real. Eliminating those inefficiencies would improve total
welfare in exactly the same way as giving people billions of dollars more
income. The size of these losses depends on (a) the size of the various gaps
between marginal cost and price, and (b) how responsive the various de-
mands are to price at those levels. For both these reasons, the principal
component of the estimated multi-billion dollar total welfare loss from
telephone pricing is the benefit lost by systematic overcharging for long
38. See, e.g., Griffin, The Welfare Implications of Externalities and Price Elasticities for Tele-
communications Pricing, 64 REv. ECON. & STAT. 59-66 (1982), estimating a welfare loss of about
$1.5 billion annually in 1975 dollars-3.0 billion in 1985 dollars, CPI-adjusted; L. Perl, Welfare
Gains From Cost-Based Telephone Pricing (June 19, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors) (estimating improvement in net social welfare consequent on moving to marginal cost pricing
of $5.5 billion in 1984 dollars-5.7 billion in 1985 dollars, CPI-adjusted). When Perl introduced the
(second-best) optimum markups above marginal cost necessary to cover aggregate revenue require-
ments (see infra Part V), this reduced the benefit to $5.1 billion in 1984 dollars-S5.3 billion in 1985
dollars, CPI-adjusted-still hardly a zero-sum game.
For an estimate showing very large welfare losses resulting from the recovery of NTS costs from
long-distance calling, see C. Jackson & J. Rohlfs, supra note 16, at 7-11.
Some of the reasons for the differences between the Griffin and Perl results, even after adjusting the
former (as we have) for the severe inflation that occurred after 1975, are: (1) Per] took into account
the cross-elasticity of demand between access and usage, while Griffin assumed it away; (2) Griffin
estimated welfare losses only for toll service, while Perl estimated welfare losses from local usage as
well; and (3) Perl's elasticity of demand for toll service is slightly higher than Griffin's, while Griffin's
elasticity of demand for local access was higher than Perl's.
All these estimates apparently fail to take into account the additional loss in welfare that occurs
when the inefficiently high price-in this case, of long-distance calling-becomes part of another's cost
of production. The transfer of inputs at a price higher than marginal cost from one stage of produc-
tion to another results, if there is any market power at that second or any subsequent stage, in a
cumulation of interstitial markups that compounds the ultimate inefficiency. See, e.g., I A. KAHN,
supra note 6, at 145 n.44; 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULArION 258-59 (1970) (treating
the pricing of inputs as exception to adequacy of price proportionality to marginal cost as means of
achieving ideal output).
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distance calling: the gap between price and marginal cost is the most egre-
gious, 9 and this is the major telephone service with the most elastic de-
mand.40 In contrast, the amount of inefficient consumption encouraged by
the apparent undercharging of residential subscribers for access is rela-
tively slight, because most people think of telephone service as a necessity
and the demand for subscribership is therefore relatively inelastic.
41
III. Some Empirical Issues
We turn now to a series of interrelated factual issues, contested with
increasing intensity in recent years, revolving around the question of
whether the costs of the subscriber access network, as determined under
traditional regulatory and telephone company accounting methods, accu-
rately reflect the marginal costs of access. Witnesses in regulatory pro-
ceedings have contended that they do not, and that therefore a large por-
tion should continue to be recovered from long-distance and perhaps other
services.
In large measure, these arguments involve questions about the design of
the network and telephone company accounting that we lack the compe-
39. See supra note 21.
40. The following estimates of price elasticity of demand for telephone services are arithmetic
averages of elasticities reported in L. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND: A SURVEY AND
CRITIQUE chs. 3 & 4 (1980). Although additional studies of demand elasticity have been performed
since Taylor's survey, our impression is that they are generally consistent with the pattern he reports.
Composite
Residential Business Residential/





Local use -0.17 -0.11 -0.22
Toll Services
Intrastate -0.35 -0.49 -0.67
Interstate -0.58 -0.54 -0.74
Other Services
All vertical (i.e.,
enhanced) services -0.99 N.A. -0.15
Extensions -0.21 -0.41 N.A.
International calls N.A. N.A. -0.91
Only U.S. demand elasticities are reported; for international calls, this means calls originating in
the U.S. The aggregate residential/business elasticities bear no necessary relationship to the cor-
resonding elasticities reported for the separated customer classes, having been obtained from different
studies.
41. See supra notes 11 and 40.
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tence to assess definitively; we attempt, however, to present the available
evidence bearing on them. In part, they raise critical questions of eco-
nomic principle, which we attempt to resolve in Parts IV and V.
We consider four factual contentions in defense of continuing to recover
a large portion of subscriber access costs from usage.
The first two are contentions that the design of the local subscriber
network depends on expected calling behavior: first, that there are costs of
designing a network suitable for long-distance calling-notably the cost of
improving the quality of the signals-that would not be incurred in de-
signing a system for local calling alone;42 and second, that higher levels of
usage require more and longer subscriber loops, either in order to mini-
mize the combined cost of access and calls or in order to keep the
probability of getting a dial tone from falling to an unacceptable level.
Those incremental access system costs are therefore properly regarded as
part of the marginal cost of calling.
Third, the very large expenditures telephone companies have been
making in recent years to upgrade subscriber access networks and central
offices-installing fiber-optic transmission and digital electronic switching
capabilities-are required not for plain old telephone service (POTS) but,
instead, for specialized and sophisticated services such as Custom Calling
(call waiting, automatic call forwarding, teleconferencing) and high-speed
data transmission.48 These costs are therefore part of the marginal cost of
the enhanced services, and should not be recovered in the flat charge for
basic service.
Fourth, the marginal cost of subscriber access, and therefore the eco-
nomically efficient charge for it, is markedly below the average revenue
requirements associated with providing it, as they have been traditionally
determined under regulation.
As we proceed to examine these assertions in this Part, we will con-
clude that some of them seem to be factually valid, and that others are
apparently not. In Part IV, however, we demonstrate that most of the
concepts of cost that they invoke are irrelevant to "first-best" efficient
pricing-that is to say, to pricing communications services at their margi-
nal costs. One reason is that some of these arguments hold usage responsi-
ble for the kind of access systems in place today and for the sunk costs
associated with them; sunk costs, however, are irrelevant to efficient pric-
ing. Another reason is that in situations where a plant provides a number
of goods or services in common, economic efficiency requires that it be so
designed as to provide them collectively at minimum aggregate cost. The
42. See, e.g., Melody Testimony, supra note 30, at 15-16, 42.
43. See, e.g., id. at 32-43.
Yale Journal on Regulation
fact that such a design may entail a higher marginal cost and therefore a
higher first-best price for one of those services than some other system
design is irrelevant.
Finally, in Part V we turn to the likelihood that the pricing of tele-
phone services will have to be "second-best" because prices set consistently
at marginal costs would evidently produce inadequate total revenues.
"Second-best" efficiency in these circumstances, we conclude, requires that
company-wide revenue deficiencies be made up primarily in the flat
charge for access, not for usage. The same is true of any revenue deficien-
cies created by a decision to subsidize some customers in order to keep
them from dropping service.
A. Designing the Access System for Long-Distance Calling
Telephone company engineers generally deny that the design of the cus-
tomer access system is in any way affected by the need to improve the
quality of signals for long-distance calling, for two reasons. First, when
amplification is needed, it makes more sense to install the amplification
devices along the interoffice trunks, where the cost of doing so is classified
as traffic-sensitive and attributed to interexchange service, rather than in
the dedicated wires between the exchange office and individual
subscribers."
Second, of the calling designated as "local," because it is covered by the
charge for local service, a very large portion-69% in urban, 46% in sub-
urban, and 34% in rural areas4"-is in fact technologically indistinguish-
able from "long-distance" service: both involve transmission between sepa-
rate telephone offices or exchanges. Anyone old enough to remember when
local telephone numbers were changed from two letters plus five digits to
seven digits is likely to recall that the letters referred to the names of
various exchange offices within the local calling area. Therefore, even if
the need to accommodate calling between exchanges did require a more
expensive subscriber access network than calling within an exchange, that
would not justify singling out what is now defined as toll service for its
present grossly disproportionate contribution to covering the costs of that
network."'
44. This assertion would seem to be confirmed by the opinion of an independent authority that
the access system we have inherited was in fact designed for the needs of local service, as a result of
which costs were imposed on the long-haul network (for example, of echo suppressors) that would not
have been required had it been. optimally designed from the outset for both services together. Letter
from Charles L. Jackson, Principal of Shooshan & Jackson Inc., Washington, D.C., to Alfred Kahn
(Oct. 25, 1984).
45. TECHNICAtL STAFF & TECHNICAL PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT, AT&T BELL LABORATO-
RIES, ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEM 125 (2d ed. 1983).
46. The same observation applies to the fact that a telephone exchange designed for calls among
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We see no need to attempt to resolve the factual issue of the assertedly
higher cost of an access network suitable for long-distance calling47 be-
cause, as we will explain more fully in Part IV, it is almost certainly
economically irrelevant.
B. The Usage-Sensitivity of Subscriber Access Costs
The contention that higher levels of usage increase the cost of the access
network clearly goes to the heart of the empirical controversies, because it
suggests that part of the revenue requirements of the access network are
really marginal costs of usage. It has several major components:
1. The historic shift from multi-party to nearly universal single-party
service, requiring a dedicated pair of wires to each subscriber, was the
consequence, at least in part, of increased average levels of calling, which
made multi-party service decreasingly attractive.48 And this in turn has
made multi-party service effectively unavailable in many areas: telephone
company engineers tell us that with so few subscribers still taking that
service, it would ordinarily cost more to assemble the necessary group,
link them together and maintain their lines (for example, to check the
source of complaints about service) than to give each customer a dedicated
line.
Entirely apart from its factual validity, 9 this argument, too, is probably
irrelevant to the efficient pricing of telephone services. The marginal costs
of linking subscribers to the exchange are what they are today, not what
they would have been had history taken a different course. This does not
mean we must approve the particular course history took.5" So long as
ten thousand subscribers or fewer can make do with switches capable of handling only four-digit
numbers, whereas exchanges suitable for handling calls involving a larger number of subscribers,
whether within a single exchange or between exchanges, require switches capable of handling seven
or ten digit numbers. This means that the marginal traffic-sensitive costs of calling do vary slightly for
this reason, depending upon their character. It has no bearing, however, on the contention that the
non-traffic-sensitive costs of subscriber plant will be higher in a system designed for local than for
long-distance calling.
47. But see supra note 44.
48. See, e.g., Wilson, Telephone Access Costs and Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1983, at
19. About eight million U.S. families still have party line service, compared with approximately three
times as many a decade ago. Wall Street J., Oct. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
49. The average number of calls placed daily per line increased by 50% during the last 30 years
or so, from 6.01 in 1950 to 9.10 in 1981. BELL SYSTEM, STATISTICAL MANUAL, 1950-81, at 807
(1982). (The ratios exclude from the denominator residence extension phones, since it is use per line
rather than per phone that determines the danger of blockage or interference on multi-party systems.)
It seems doubtful that this increase in traffic could have played as significant a role in decreasing the
demand for multi-party service as rising personal incomes and the increasingly widespread desire for
the greater convenience of single-party service. The Rural Electrification Administration has long had
the policy of making its low-cost loans to independent telephone companies contingent upon their
shifting over entirely to single-party service.
50. For our reservations in this particular case, see infra note 101.
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that course is unlikely to be reversed, however, marginal costs must be
calculated and efficient prices set on the basis of the present and future
consequences of buyers taking more or less of the services now available,
not of services no longer available, as we will explain more fully in Part
IV.
2. The less people actually use their phones, the greater the opportunity
the telephone companies have to install concentrators, with a dedicated
pair of wires extending from each subscriber not to the central office but
only to a concentrator, from which-just as in the case of a
switchboard-only a smaller number of lines or trunks would continue to
the central office. Conversely, the more subscribers use their lines, the
greater the likelihood, with any given degree of concentration, of one of
them being unable to get an outside line to the central office upon de-
mand, and therefore the larger the number of lines or trunks required.
Telephone company engineers say that it is rarely economic to install
concentrators. Instead, they say, recent advances in electronic technology
have provided the economically superior alternative of multiplexing; this
achieves the desired reduction in the cost of providing customer access
while still giving individual subscribers their own dedicated electronic
channels, which they are free to use continuously, twenty-four hours a
day." Critics respond that the telephone companies do not consistently
exploit the opportunity afforded by concentrators to lower the cost of
access.
The issue deserves closer scrutiny, because it is clearly relevant to effi-
cient service. It raises the question of whether the telephone companies'
traditional practice of giving each subscriber a fully dedicated line is eco-
nomically efficient, and whether, therefore, the charge for access should
reflect the costs of that practice.
3. In a subtle variation of the preceding contention, some economists
have contended that costs of the subscriber loop are indeed "usage-
sensitive" because subscribers who place large numbers of calls will often
order a second telephone line. Similarly, customers with switchboards will
order fewer or more trunks to connect them to the telephone exchange,
depending upon the volume of usage of all the telephones that reach the
network through the switchboard.52 This fact does not, however, make the
51. The device most frequently referred to is "Subscriber Loop Carrier 96," or SLC 96, which in
effect attaches 96 customers to the central office at some point between their premises and the central
exchange via a much smaller number of cable pairs. These are, however, capable of carrying 96
simultaneous conversations.
52. N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 20. The Cornell and Noll paper is concerned only
with the question of whether local service may properly be regarded as "subsidized," not with efficient
pricing as such. Their contention that the cost of subscriber plant is not wholly NTS, however, bears
inevitably-and equally-on both questions.
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cost of each line or trunk usage-sensitive in the sense that it is higher or
lower depending on how much it is used. And that is the relevant fact,
since the issue is how to price each line or trunk. Advocates of separate
subscriber access charges fully covering incremental costs (or more) would
of course wish to see them levied on a per-line basis, since the more lines
subscribers take the higher the cost they impose on the phone company. In
that event, heavy-using customers who order more lines would indeed
bear the additional costs that their heavier usage imposes on the system.
But they would not and should not do so in the form of charges per call
or per minute of calling, so long as the cost to the supplying company is
the same whether they use their lines or not.
Another observer has found a slightly different route to the same logical
pitfall." It is generally conceded, he observes, that the amount of trans-
mission line capacity a telephone company has to install between one cen-
tral office and another-in effect from one switch to another-is usage-
sensitive, since it depends on the volume of traffic. The same is obviously
true of the number of trunks or lines required between a customer's own
PBX and the telephone office-again, from one switch to another. The
only difference between the two situations is that the telephone company
owns both switches in the first case, whereas in the second the subscriber
owns one of them and the transmission lines are therefore part of the
subscriber access network. But the two situations are technologically indis-
tinguishable. If the costs of the first transmission system between the two
switches are usage-sensitive, and therefore properly regarded as part of
the marginal costs of calling, the costs of the second must be also: how
could it be otherwise?
The facts are indisputable; the inference is not. This line of argument
simply confuses the marginal cost of increased usage to the subscriber, in
terms of the number of access lines he will require-like the marginal
costs of a greater appetite, in terms of the number of frankfurters one
buys-and the marginal cost to the supplier entailed in more or less usage
of each access line. No one denies that the provision of additional access
lines imposes incremental costs on the telephone company, just as supply-
ing additional frankfurters imposes costs on the meat packer. For this rea-
son, economic efficiency requires that each line (and frankfurter) be priced
at the marginal cost of providing it. But it does not at all follow that the
marginal costs of each access line should be incorporated in part in the
53. D. Chessler, Notes from "Structure of the Communications Marketplace" (Apr. 9, 1986)
(unpublished notes on a conference at Dartmouth College) (on file with the authors). See also NA-
TIONAL REGUILATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF TEIEPHONE ACcESs CHARGES: AN EM-
PIRICAl. ANALYSIS OF BELL COMPANIES IN FIvE REGIONS 166-67 (1983).
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charges for using that line, any more than the costs of the frankfurter be
recovered in greater or lesser measure depending on what the purchaser
does with it. The number of lines a subscriber orders could be and obvi-
ously is sensitive to the total amount of calling he does, while the cost per
line to the provider might nevertheless be totally insensitive to the amount
of calling the purchaser does on that line.
4. The availability of concentrators is an example of a more general
phenomenon: the provision of local loops to subscribers and the incurrence
of the admittedly traffic-sensitive costs of switches are substitutable. 4 The
telephone company has the alternative of putting more small switches or
central offices-in effect, concentrators-out among its subscribers,
thereby reducing the average length of access lines to them, or installing
fewer, larger switches or offices, with correspondingly longer access lines,
on average. In consequence, the particular mixture or proportions of TS
and NTS costs embodied in either the existing telephone company plant
or newly designed systems reflect technology choices that may or may not
have been guided exclusively by considerations of efficiency.
The pertinent question, however, is whether the proportions in which
these substitutable costs are actually being incurred exaggerates what the
marginal costs of subscriber access would be in an efficiently designed sys-
tem and underestimates the marginal costs of usage. We can think of one
reason why they might: the telephone companies can transfer a larger
proportion of the costs of the access network than of their switching facili-
ties over to the interstate jurisdiction, via their NTS-cost-recovering access
charges to long-distance carriers." This could distort the way in which
they balance the two costs against one another when they design the net-
work. Telephone company engineers say they seek to minimize total cost,
without regard to who pays for what. In any event, if such a distortion
were present, it would itself be attributable to the present system of
overcharging long-distance calling and would hardly constitute a defense
of that system.
Nina Cornell and Roger Noll suggest that telephone company engineers
are not making system planning decisions that minimize total cost." Spe-
cifically, they assert that rapidly evolving electronic technology might be
expected to have shown up in increasing recourse to remote switches and
the multiplexing devices to which we have already referred, on the one
side, and correspondingly shorter subscriber access loops, on the other.'"
54. See N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 62-63.
55. The allocation factor for interstate purposes has been capped at a nationwide average of about
28%, and is scheduled to decline to 25%. See Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, supra note 8, at 177.
56. Supra note 9.
57. For a graphic exposition, see P. HUBER, THr GEODESIC NETWORK, 1987, REPORT ON
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And yet it appears that the telephone company switches are growing
larger in capacity and loop lengths increasing. This strongly suggests, they
say, that current practices inefficiently inflate the marginal costs of ac-
cess.68 In rebuttal, William Taylor and Paul Brandon list a number of
other considerations that could well explain why, consistently with effi-
cient system design, switching centers have not become more numerous
and access lines shorter."'
We have not seen a clear exposition of the proposition that additional
usage tilts the balance of system design on the side of few exchanges and
longer access lines, and therefore higher marginal costs of providing sub-
scribers with access. The case for the causal connection, it appears, would
run along the following lines: Splitting an exchange into smaller, more
numerous units permits reduction in line costs, but at the expense of
higher switching and interexchange trunking costs. Splitting reduces the
cost of access but increases the marginal cost of calls. It is therefore less
likely to be economic the greater the volume of calling. Heavier usage
both increases the switching cost penalty and reduces the savings in line
costs-the latter because the greater the volume of calling the larger the
capacity of the trunks that have to be installed to connect the newly-
created separate exchanges. In a nutshell, heavy usage makes economic a
technology in which access costs are relatively high and call costs rela-
tively low.
There have been several efforts to test empirically the proposition that
the costs of subscriber access are in fact positively correlated with usage
and therefore improperly labelled non-traffic-sensitive. For example,
Margaret M. Dalton has attempted to explain statistically the costs per
subscriber loop classified as NTS by the Uniform System of Accounts, in
terms of the number of subscriber loops, the size and density of exchanges,
the percentage of the distribution system that is underground, the average
minutes of use per loop, and the percentage of call minutes accounted for
by toll calls." The resulting correlations suggest that NTS costs are sys-
tematically higher in areas characterized by relatively heavy calling and a
relatively high proportion of toll calls. Professor Dalton interprets these
COMPETrIION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 1.2-1.6 (1987) (published by Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).
58. See N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 63-64.
59. Among these are the costs of the land and buildings required to house the additional switching
centers; economies of scale in components of electronic switching systems; the changes in the inter-
office trunking that would be necessitated by more dispersed switches; and the costs of maintaining the
additional switches, which, being highly labor-intensive, have increased more than the capital costs.
W. Taylor & P. Brandon, Local Telephone Pricing and the Subsidy Question-A Critical Appraisal
19-21 (1986) (unpublished manuscript available from Bell Communications Research).
60. M. Dalton, A Critique of the Classification of NTS Costs (rev. ed. Jan. 1987) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors).
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results as evidence that some of the costs classified by the Uniform System
of Accounts as non-traffic-sensitive are in fact traffic-sensitive and "conse-
quently . . .prices based on these costs will violate the standard of cost
causation.""1
This conclusion raises two questions. First, are such statistical infer-
ences "correct"? Second, assuming that they are, what is their relevance to
pricing policy?
It is impossible to say whether the correlations Dalton found between
calling and NTS costs are real or spurious; pointing out the deficiencies of
her study is easier than assessing their effect on the results. The study did
not consider, for example, such important determinants of access costs as
average loop length (for which the density of exchanges is an only imper-
fect proxy) and the share of access lines accounted for by business custom-
ers (the costs of which, several studies have found, are systematically
lower than those of residential lines, perhaps because they tend to be
shorter).
More troubling, the costs Dalton analyzed were accounting costs, as
they appear on the companies' books. These are heavily affected by when
the subscriber plant was installed: because of inflation, average book costs
will be lower for old than for recently acquired plant. There is evidence
that this failure to take the varying vintages of plant into account may
have strongly influenced her results. A study performed by one of us ob-
tained results similar to hers when differences in the average age of assets
were ignored. However, when the change in recorded access costs over a
four-year period was related to the corresponding change in local and toll
calls and other factors, the correlation between call volumes and NTS
costs all but vanished.62 Since this formulation mitigated considerably the
problem of not knowing the years in which investments were made and
hence the average age of the assets being compared, it should not be sur-
prising that it also proved to have a much higher explanatory power than
the Dalton-like specifications estimated from the same data set. And it
suggested that the accounting measure of NTS costs is in fact independent
of usage.
Finally, even if true current or marginal costs were indeed correlated
with call volumes, it would not follow that economically efficient pricing
would recover some portion of these costs in the charges for calling. As we
demonstrate more fully in Part IV, the marginal cost of providing sub-
scribers access to the network of an efficiently designed system should be
61. Id. at 19.
62. W. Shew, The Cost of Access (Aug. 23, 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors).
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recovered in the price charged for access-even though those costs might
be lower in some other hypothetical system designed for less loquacious
subscribers.6"
C. The Cost of Upgrading for New Services
Telephone company witnesses in the proceedings in which we have
been involved have uniformly denied that their estimates of incremental
subscriber access costs incorporate any incremental costs of providing sup-
plemental, enhanced services.64 The provision of the various Custom Call-
ing services has no effect, they say, on the design of the local loops, but is
taken care of in the electronic switches in their central office or in installa-
tions on the customer's premises. Their decisions to install fiber-optics in
the subscriber access network (in the high-capacity feeder cable that con-
nects central offices with the distribution lines fanning out to subscribers'
premises), which is indeed preferable for high speed transmission of data
and video signals, are driven, they assert, by its lower capital and mainte-
nance costs, which make it more economical than the traditional copper
cable even for POTS. And any special enhancements of the access system
or installations required by the specific needs of specific customers are
assigned to those customers.
There seems little reason to doubt that the installation of fiber-optic
feeder cable is a more economical method of providing for growth of
POTS than copper cable. There is active controversy, however, over tele-
phone company assertions that their very large modernization programs,
involving mainly the replacement of electromechanical switching with
electronic switching systems (ESS), are similarly justified. 6 Since the
63. As that discussion will disclose, the applicable principle in the event the system is not effi-
ciently designed is more complicated. See infra text accompanying notes 91 and 92.
64. For many years the Bell companies performed so-called embedded direct analyses (EDAs),
which attempted to distribute their revenue requirements (with a very large component of book or
embedded costs) among the broad categories of services. In those studies, their witnesses concede, all
the costs of subscriber loop, including such enhancements, were indeed included and attributed to the
access category.
65. In an extensive, intensely critical report, the Public Staff of the California Public Utilities
Commission presented a slashing criticism of virtually all aspects of the Pacific Bell Company's proce-
dures and practices and of the economic merits of its very costly plant modernization programs. PuB-
LIC UTILITIES COMMISSION REPORT ON PLANT MODERNIZATION OF PACIFIc BELL (1985). The
Company had invested $1.1 billion in switch modernization alone over the preceding decade. In re
Application of Pacific Bell Telephone Co., California Pub. Util. Comm'n No. 85-01-034 (April 21,
1986) (statement of Lewis Perl). While the major portion of the Company's modernization expendi-
tures have been concentrated on the exchange itself, some of the Staff's criticisms applied to moderni-
zation of outside plant as well.
Over and above accusations that the Company had refused to supply necessary information and
documentation and failed to monitor the effects of these programs, the essence of the Staff complaint is
that the Company's practices and investment criteria have created a systematic bias toward impru-
dently replacing existing plant at any cost and irrespective of the effects on ratepayers. (In one specific
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economics of the shift is, properly, influenced additionally by the ability of
ESS to provide new services as well, the controversy over the economic
justifiability of these investments extends to the estimates of the net reve-
nues those services will generate. If, rather than merely minimizing the
cost of providing POTS, this expectation tips the balance in favor of ESS,
and the companies' expectations about the profitability of those services
prove excessively optimistic, the incremental costs of subscriber access may
be illegitimately (and therefore inefficiently) inflated.""
The importance of this issue and the intensity of the controversies over
it are enhanced by the fact that a very large part of the costs of digital
switches are indeed non-traffic-sensitive. This is so because the engineer-
ing of these systems has the effect of transferring many of the functions
performed in the central processing units of the older analog electronic
switches, the costs of which do vary with usage, to the equipment at the
termination point of the subscribers' lines, which is really part of sub-
scriber plant.6 In consequence, the substitution of digital for analog elec-
tronics or for the old electromechanical switches, even if justified entirely
instance-the assertion that the Company mistakenly used a before-tax rather than an after-tax cost
of capital-the Staff criticism was clearly inconsistent with this conclusion: a. lower cost of capital
would have justified more investment, not less. Id. at 17.)
Among the Staff's contentions were that, contrary to the Company's claims that these moderniza-
tion expenditures were fully justified in terms of cost savings alone, expected revenues from Custom
Calling services played an important, in some cases a crucial role; the staff argued that without those
anticipated revenues many of the investments would not have been justified, and that the revenue
estimates were often crucially unrealistic. Pacific Bell has of course responded at length. On behalf of
the Company, Lewis Perl argued, among other things, that it was wholly proper to have factored the
revenues from new services into investment decisions, and that the Staff's findings of negative cost
savings were fatally flawed by at least two major errors: (1) a failure to recognize the inextricable
interrelationship between investments for modernization and for growth, because (among other things)
of very large scale economies in electronic switching-which led them to overlook the fact that if ESS
were employed only to handle growth (as the Staff assumed in their base case), the unit costs would
have been much higher; and, (2) calculating the costs and benefits of modernization investments only
for the period 1974-1986, which gave heavy weight to the greatly expanded investment outlays during
the latter part of the period but omitted the large payoffs in maintenance cost savings thereafter.
Correction for the two errors alone, Perl maintained, would convert the Staff's estimates into very
large net savings in cost alone. Id. at 10, 15-21, and passim.
66. Moreover, the actual regulated charges for POTS, which is still typically priced on a residual
basis-that is, after applying against total costs the revenues from all other services-could be driven
up, rather than down, by the changeover.
67. Under the old separations accounting formula, 70% of the costs of digital switches were classi-
fied as NTS. One company informs us that its engineers have concluded that the 70% allocation to
subscriber plant is unrealistically high-their estimates range between 30% and 53%; and that they
use the lower figures in their studies of the current costs of installing subscriber lines. They concede
that even with thiise reduced estimates, however, the effect of "growing digital" might well in the
short-run be to raise the current cost per subscriber line.
Actually, the causal relationships are even more complex. The installation of digital switches in the
central offices also makes it more economical than it would otherwise be to install electronics in the
access lines themselves-the multiplexing to which we have already alluded-and fiberoptic feeder
cable, both of which tend to reduce the costs of subscriber loops.
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in terms of minimizing overall costs, might nevertheless result in increas-
ing the apparent marginal costs of subscriber access.
The pertinent policy question, then (to which we turn in Part IV),
would be whether the economically efficient flat subscriber access charge
should in these circumstances be increased correspondingly. As our pre-
ceding discussion has already suggested, the answer to that question will
depend in the first instance on whether the investments in question have
been economically efficient, taking into account both the anticipated net
revenues from the additional services they make it possible to offer and
minimization of total system cost. It is not possible for non-engineers like
us to answer that complex factual question definitively. We will try in
Part IV to elucidate the pertinent principles, and will also comment
briefly on the totally unsatisfactory character of our present institutional
arrangements for seeking answers, poignantly illustrated by the regulatory
imbroglio in California over the legitimacy of the telephone companies'
modernization expenditures and the legitimacy of charging them to POTS
customers. 68
D. Marginal vs. Embedded Costs of Subscriber Access
The contention that the marginal costs of subscriber access are lower
than the average revenue requirements of non-traffic-sensitive plant, as
traditionally measured, has several major components:
First, telephone companies build capacity in lumps, so that typically
there will be excess capacity in both their high-capacity feeder cable and
distribution lines. This means that short-run marginal costs of subscriber
access-the cost of adding another customer to the system-are ordinarily
below long-run or average costs. 6 '
Second, the companies systematically overinvest in capacity, so that the
proper marginal cost of subscriber plant is typically lower than the long-
run marginal and average costs they actually incur."0
Third, many telephone companies have large surpluses of Centrex
lines, either installed in anticipation of demand that never materialized or
left stranded when the service was replaced by customers installing their
own PBXs. As a result, once again, both short- and long-run marginal
costs may fall far short of average revenue requirements."
Fourth, a large part of the regulatorily-determined revenue
68. See supra note 65.
69. See G. BROCK, supra note 4, at 27-29; Wilson, supra note 48, at 21-22.
70. N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 74.
71. Id. at 41. Obviously, to the extent the capacity can be or has been used to serve other custom-
ers, this condition does not prevail.
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requirements associated with subscriber plant has consisted of the carrying
charges on the ("non-recurring") costs associated merely with the reposi-
tioning of existing phones rather than net new installations.7" Instead of
being charged to the responsible parties, these costs were until recently
capitalized and charged to ratepayers at large.73
Finally, the capital charges component of revenue requirements, which
are extremely important because the telephone business is so capital inten-
sive, are determined, under regulation, on the basis of book (depreciated
original) cost. Because of inadequate depreciation rates in the past, the
book value of telephone company investments far exceeds current market
value; the estimate of this excess most widely cited is on the order of
twenty-five billion dollars.7 '
Although we are not in a position in most cases to assess their quantita-
tive importance, each of these assertions appears to be factually correct,
with the possible exception of the second, on which we are unable to make
a judgment.75 The critical question about each, as about most of the other
factual assertions we have surveyed in this section, is what significance it
has for the economically efficient pricing of telephone services. To answer
that question it becomes necessary to expound the applicable regulatory
and economic principles-to which task we now turn.
76
72. Id. at 26-27.
73. It was only in 1981 that the FCC reversed that practice and required the direct expensing and
charging of these costs to the responsible customers. Uniform System of Accounts, 85 F.C.C. 2d 818
(1981).
74. Letter from Irwin D. Fries, Chairman of the U.S. Telephone Association, ad hoc Committee
on Capital Recovery, to Depreciation Rates Section, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC (Dec. 10, 1986)
(citing $26 billion as "the most appropriate definition") (copy on file with the authors). For a New
York Public Service Commission staff member's disagreement with the $26 billion figure, see
TELECOMM. REP., Oct. 27, 1986, at 9.
75. That does not mean they are all equally relevant. For example, while there seems to be no
doubt about the overvaluation of telephone company plant on the books and the consequence that on
average marginal costs fall short of average revenue requirements, it is less clear that that is true of
the subscriber access system. In view of the large component of (current) labor and materials in the
costs of installing and maintaining that network, it is more uncertain here than in the other parts of
the business which way the balance of the two offsetting determinants of this relationship tilts-the
effect of technological progress outrunning historic depreciation rates, on the one hand, and the cumu-
lative effect of historic inflation on current costs, on the other. W. Taylor & P. Brandon, supra note
59, at 18.
76. This is not to deny the importance of the factual questions. The Bell Operating Companies
frequently contrast the current average bill for local service of about 512 per month with embedded
costs (i.e., the revenue requirements as traditionally determined) of providing subscriber access of $26
per month. See J. LANDE & P. WYNNS, PRIMER AND SOURCEBOOK ON TELEPHONE PRICE INDEXES
AND RATE LEVELS 56 (1987) (published by Industry Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission) (providing 1986 figures for average bill for local service);
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE CHANGING TELEPHONE INDUSTRY: ACCESS CHARGES, UNI-
VERSAL. SERVICE, AND LOCAL RATES 12-13 (1984) (providing 1981 figures for embedded costs of
furnishing subscriber access). Some more recent studies of the current or long-run marginal costs of
subscriber access alone (referred to by some companies as dial tone line cost studies) have produced
lower results. Southwestern Bell has produced an estimate of $17 for Oklahoma (plus an additional
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IV. The Applicable Principles: First-Best
Only someone who has been exposed to the flood of adversarial testi-
mony on these subjects during the last several years can appreciate how
difficult and how necessary it is to try to sort out the economics from the
politics and the relevant arguments from the irrelevant. Clarifying the
pertinent underlying principles alone should resolve many of the policy
issues. In the remaining cases, it should at least help pose the pertinent
factual questions; we will never get the policy answers right if we do not
ask the right questions.
77
A. Economically Relevant and Irrelevant Costs
The basic principle of "first-best" economic efficiency is that all goods
and services should be priced at the marginal costs of providing them.
(Having stated the principle, it becomes necessary at once to attach at
least two qualifications to which we will return-first, "to the extent it is
economically feasible to do so," and, second, "except insofar as transac-
tions have external consequences not reflected in the private costs and ben-
efits that motivate them.")
Under this principle, the factual issues that were the subject of Part III
are, in large measure, arguments about economically irrelevant measures
of cost. This is almost certainly true of the contentions that the present
access system developed, historically, in order to accommodate long-
distance calling. It is true also of the claim that increasing usage has been
responsible for the prevalence of single-party service and the consequent
limited availability of multi-party service. Even if those assertions were
$7.39 for average local usage). Kahn Oklahoma Testimony, supra note 21, at 38. Cornell and Noll
present extremely telling criticisms of a C&P Telephone Company study that produced estimates of
$41 and $23 monthly incremental costs for Maryland and the District of Columbia, respectively, and
contrast it with estimates by GTE of Wisconsin of $7 to $14 for various groups of its subscribers, and
$3 to $14 for Illinois subscribers by Illinois Bell. They also present analyses of Rural Electrification
Administration costs suggesting that incremental costs are already being covered by prevailing charges.
N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 64. A recent study by the New England Telephone Co. has
produced an estimate of $12.50. New England Telephone Company, Incremental Cost Study for the
State of Massachusetts 3 (filed with the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities on Apr. 18,
1986) (unpublished report on file with the authors). On the other hand, Jackson and Rohlfs continue.
to regard $15 to $30 as the plausible range of marginal costs of subscriber access. C. Jackson & J.
Rohlfs, supra note 16, at 4.
Manifestly, as Cornell and Noll point out, some of the later estimates cast doubt on the extent to
which "basic service" (which, however, typically includes unlimited local calling as well) is today still
"subsidized" in the sense of being priced below marginal cost-a question to which we return below.
77. This is not to suggest, naively, that effective regulation consists simply in separating truth
from falsehood or invariably giving priority to the dictates of economic efficiency over other considera-
tions. Policy is not likely to be intelligently made, however, if economists present regulators with
purportedly economic arguments that are in fact simple fallacies, or with recommendations purport-
edly justified on non-economic grounds without considering whether the recommended courses of ac-
tion would achieve those noneconomic goals at minimum economic cost.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 4: 191, 1987
factually correct, they would not provide an economic justification for
levying the carrying costs of the access network on usage today.7" These
incremental system design costs would be part of the marginal costs of
usage (or long-distance usage) and properly reflected in its price only to
the extent that doing so would result in society saving those costs in its
future expenditures on providing access.
Economically efficient pricing looks not to the past-not to how we got
where we are-but to the future; efficiency requires that prices tell cus-
tomers what incremental resources society will use if they take more of the
good or service in question, what resources society will save if they con-
sume less of it. If, as seems to be the case, charging usage the higher
access costs it has assertedly caused would not reverse the historical pro-
cess that produced the present access network,79 then the incremental costs
of neither single-party (as compared with multi-party) access nor of de-
signing the system for long-distance calling are part of either the short- or
long-term marginal costs of calling. In that event, these costs should not be
imposed on usage, whatever its past responsibility for the present config-
uration of the system.80
78. Wilson is correct in pointing out that where multi-party service is still available, use of the
shared access line by one subscriber imposes congestion costs on the other parties. Wilson, supra note
48, at 20. Those marginal congestion costs should in principle be reflected in the charges for calling.
The relevance of that observation to pricing policy is unclear, however, in view of Wilson's opposition
to local measured service and the apparent infeasibility of measured charging for local calls on multi-
party lines.
The phenomenon of usage imposing congestion costs on other subscribers is a universal one, in no
way confined to multi-party service. Economic efficiency clearly calls for reflecting those marginal
congestion costs-which are obviously traffic sensitive-in charges for calling, as long as the efficiency
benefits of doing so exceed the costs. We discuss that concluding qualification in Part IV-C below.
79. According to Gerald R. Faulhaber, it was Bell's acquisition of control over the process making
possible cheap, reliable, and audible long distance service that enabled it by 1913 to regain the indus-
try dominance it had quickly lost upon expiration of the original Bell patents twenty years earlier. G.
Faulhaber, Telecommunications in Turmoil, Technology and Public Policy 20 (Sept. 4, 1986) (un-
published manuscript on file with the authors).
80. It may seem anomalous to contend that the level of marginal costs depends on whether incor-
porating certain costs in price would or would not reverse the historical process: we do not ordinarily
think of the marginal cost of a particular service-in this case, calling-being dependent on the elas-
ticity of its demand. If the demand for calling were so elastic that charging it with the incremental
design costs that some commentators claim it has forced on the access network would result in a less
expensively designed network, and in that event callers should clearly be confronted with prices incor-
porating those incremental costs, why should they not even if their demand is inelastic?
The answer lies in the straightforward economic principle that marginal cost is not a unique num-
ber but a functional relation between output and cost, whose value will vary from one part of an
industry's supply function to another. The value that is relevant for efficient pricing will be deter-
mined by the level and elasticity of demand at various prices. If the demand for the ability to place
and receive long distance calls is so strong and unresponsive to price within the relevant range as
inalterably to require a network universally capable of satisfying it, then the costs actually imposed on
society by customers subscribing to more rather than fewer lines and making more or fewer calls are
what they are in that situation-not what they would be if those services were supplied by some
hypothetical network inconsistent with subscribers' demands. In those circumstances, it would in fact
encourage oversubscription to lines and underutilization of them if subscription were charged less and
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The assertions about how the present system evolved are really argu-
ments about sunk costs-fixed costs that have already been irretrievably
incurred. There is no truism in economics more elementary than that
sunk costs are to be ignored in deciding how best to use the resources that
are available to us today and that will be available in the future.
This truism does not mean that first-best efficiency ignores fixed costs
or makes no provision for their recovery. Nor does it mean that, as some
witnesses in state regulatory proceedings have contended, fixed and non-
traffic-sensitive costs are one and the same,"x or that advocates of recover-
ing the latter in a flat subscriber access fee are therefore simply proposing
that all fixed or capital costs be recovered in the flat monthly charge for
POTS, and only variable costs in usage charges.8 2 Those contentions con-
fuse two distinct dichotomies-one between fixed and variable costs, the
other between usage-sensitive and non-usage-sensitive costs.
Short-run marginal or incremental costs do not explicitly include the
costs; they include variable costs only. Long-run incremental costs, in con-
trast, do explicitly include the costs associated with adding capacity. As a
matter of pure economic principle, prices should ideally be equated to the
former of these, which, properly defined, include opportunity costs (con-
gestion, for example) as well as production costs. 83 Although pricing at
short-run marginal cost (SRMC) seems to ignore fixed costs, it is not in-
compatible with their recovery. On the contrary, SRMC will be above or
below average variable costs, depending upon the relationship of produc-
tion to capacity; so pricing at SRMC will make a contribution to the cov-
erage of capital costs-a contribution that will at times fall short of, and
at other times exceed average recovery. Therefore, recommending that
calling more than the costs society would save, respectively, if customers took less of either of the two
services.
The same principle would apply to the question of whether the subscriber access charge properly
includes the additional NTS cost attributable to the shift from electromechanical and analog to digital
switching. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. If the latter is the most efficient technology and
if it involves higher marginal costs of access than a less efficient technology, then those higher costs are
what the access charge should reflect. On the other hand, if the enhancement of marginal subscriber
access costs is causally attributable to (a) introduction of other services or (b) reduction of marginal
costs of usage, and if levying those incremental NTS costs on those other beneficiary services would
render digital switching uneconomic, then presumably the switch to digital would in fact be economi-
cally unjustified and the marginal cost of (economically efficient) access overstated.
81. "By definition incremental cost ignores all embedded orfixed (NTS) costs." In re Application
of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n Cause No. 29,321, at 18 (1985)
(statement of Thomas H. Fish) (emphasis added).
82. Cf Wilson, supra note 48, at 20 ("To argue . . . that once a loop is installed its costs are
sunk, and therefore marginal cost rules dictate that the price for access use should be zero, is similar
to arguing that once a nuclear power plant is built its costs are sunk and nuclear power should be sold
at . . . a price equal to only the variable running cost of the plant.").
83. See I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 70-75; Andersson & Bohman, Short- and Long-Run Margi-
nal Cost Pricing, 7 ENERGY ECON. 279 (1985).
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local and long-distance calls be priced at SRMC in no sense involves
assigning the recovery of fixed costs exclusively to the subscriber access
price.
Moreover, it will ordinarily be more practicable to base utility rates not
on short-run, but instead on long-run incremental costs (LRIC). To the
extent that in the long run additional consumption or use of a particular
service will involve additional investment, the capital costs associated with
that investment will be explicitly included in LRIC, and therefore in
price.
For example, as usage of the telephone system increases at busy hours,
the consequence is additional congestion on the lines. This congestion is a
short-run marginal (traffic-sensitive) cost. In order to maintain previous
standards of quality, telephone companies must expand capacity. The ca-
pacity costs they incur in this way are traffic-sensitive, because they are
marginally attributable to usage, and may be regarded as the long-run
marginal cost equivalent of the congestion costs that they mitigate. In
equilibrium, the two will be equal: companies will add capacity (i.e., in-
cur incremental capital costs) only up to the point where the costs of doing
so are equated to the congestion costs that they relieve. It is clear, then,
that both usage-sensitive and non-usage-sensitive costs can be fixed or va-
riable; conversely, both fixed and variable costs can be usage-sensitive or
non-usage-sensitive.8 '
The proper treatment of sunk costs and of the difference between long-
run and short-run marginal cost is raised also by the question of whether
the basic charge for teleph 'ne service should cover the costs of spare access
capacity. The threshold question, under first-best pricing principles, is
whether the amount of capacity the telephone companies install at any
one time is justified in terms of cost minimization. It is very expensive to
go back to the distribution cable, which runs between the heavy capacity
feeder cable and the subscribers, in order to install additional capacity
when it is actually needed. The companies, therefore, typically install ex-
tra wire pairs, whose incremental costs are very low, when they make the
initial installations, in order to accommodate future demand. In the case
of the much larger feeder cable, in contrast, it is feasible to put additional
bundles of wire pairs into the conduit at intervals over time, and it would
be also very expensive to build capacity far in advance. Here, therefore,
84. If one were to envision, therefore, a two-by-two matrix, with the first distinction running
across the top (one column representing usage-sensitive and the other non-usage-sensitive costs), and
the second down the left side (one line representing fixed and the other variable costs), one can readily
determine that all four boxes will be occupied. To complete the illustration it is necessary only to
observe that NTS costs will embrace both fixed carrying charges on the investment in subscriber plant
and variable costs of maintenance and service, to the extent these costs too are independent of usage.
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companies will normally install enough cable to handle only a few years'
demand growth. These calculations necessarily give substantial weight to
the fact that the cost of physically installing the added capacity, which is
largely independent of the amount of capacity added, is a large part of the
total cost; this consideration makes it efficient to add capacity in large
lumps, and inevitably results in the presence of considerable spare capac-
ity at any given time.
To the extent, then, that the minimum incremental cost of providing
subscriber lines includes the cost of carrying spare capacity for growth,
economic efficiency clearly requires that all of that cost be reflected in the
access charge.8 If, however, installation of capacity has exceeded the point
of cost minimization, as critics of the companies assert,86 the question be-
comes one not of first-best pricing but whether those sunk costs should be
recovered at all, and, if so, how to recover them with the smallest loss of
efficiency.
Regulators in the great majority of states that follow original cost or
prudent investment principles cannot simply ignore sunk costs. They can-
not avoid considering, for example, whether the telephone companies may
have designed a system of higher quality, at higher investment cost, than
was justified.8" If they find those investments were imprudently under-
taken, they are entitled-indeed obligated-to disallow recovery of the as-
sociated carrying charges. By the same token, to the extent those expendi-
tures were prudently made, regulatory commissions have an obligation, in
original cost jurisdictions, to permit the companies a reasonable opportu-
nity to recover their sunk costs.
These regulatory principles apply with especial force to the assertion
that the marginal costs of access are likely to be markedly below average
revenue requirements, as traditionally determined, because a very large
component of the revenue requirements is comprised of the carrying
charges on the capitalized cost of telephone installations, turnovers, and
moves. This fact hardly constitutes an argument against recovery of those
costs, considering that the regulatory commissions themselves have histori-
85. We consider infra at text accompanying note 118 whether the charge should vary over time,
reflecting the changing relationship of SRMC to LRIC.
86. See N. Cornell & R. Noll, supra note 9, at 74.
87. That is, the telephone companies may have introduced incrementally higher levels of reliabil-
ity or capacity, the cost of which exceeded the benefits of doing so. It is a commonplace of the regula-
tory literature that such a policy will be in the interest of a company regulated on the basis of tradi-
tional rate base/rate of return methods whenever it appears that the return on incremental
investments will exceed the incremental cost of capital. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm
Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
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cally not only sanctioned but also insisted on capitalizing them rather than
recovering them directly from the responsible parties.88
In any event, however, the question of what proportion of these sunk
costs telephone companies should be permitted to recover is totally irrele-
vant to the question of how costs that are determined to have been pru-
dently incurred should be recovered from ratepayers under first-best prin-
ciples. Economic efficiency requires that they be ignored, in the first
instance, and that rates be set at the marginal costs of an efficiently
designed system. To the extent, then, that such rates fail to produce suffi-
cient total revenues, we move to the world of second-best, which is the
subject of our Part V.
The foregoing enunciation of first-best principles applies equally to the
assertions that heavy usage discourages the substitution of remote switches
for long access lines,89 and that the telephone companies are attempting
illegitimately to load on to POTS customers a portion of the costs of up-
grading their non-traffic-sensitive access networks in order to offer various
sophisticated services. The first question is whether those investments are
economically efficient, minimizing the combined costs of access, calling,
and the newer services; and in this assessment it is necessary to take into
account the sufficiency of the incremental net revenues flowing from the
services the investments make it possible to offer. If the expenditures are
efficient-that is, if they conduce to the efficient design of the entire
system-then the marginal costs of the several services at which their
prices should be set are their marginal costs under that system. Specifi-
cally, if the efficient system entails a higher proportion of NTS subscriber
plant costs than some other design, the economically first-best flat rates to
POTS customers will reflect those higher costs: The marginal costs of ac-
cess are what they are in the system that is optimally designed to satisfy
all the demands it serves.90
What if, however, the current investment decisions of the telephone
companies affecting the marginal cost of subscriber access are indeed not
88. On the change in this practice in 1981, see supra note 73.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
90. It is theoretically possible that following this principle would result in a price of access for
POTS above the costs of providing it alone-i.e., above its so-called stand-alone-costs-and therefore
perhaps above the levels that would prevail if competition were feasible. This is the hypothetical
situation developed in the literature recently on the sustainability of a monopoly based on economies
of scope in the face of competitive entry, which has demonstrated that entry might actually be incom-
patible with economic efficiency. See W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATWRAL MONOPOLY ch. 5
(1982). Whether we are actually presented with such a dilemma here-whether, that is, the efficient
price of access would exceed the average total cost of supplying it alone-is a factual question that we
are not in a position to answer. Whatever the answer, however, it would not alter the definition of the
efficient solution.
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efficient? What if they inefficiently inflate those costs?"' Here the pre-
scription for economic efficiency becomes more complicated. Conceivably,
the companies should be made to absorb the costs of the
mistakes-whether because the investments were demonstrably imprudent
or under some other regulatory principle. But such a rule would result in
inefficient purchase decisions by those companies' customers if prices-in
this case the charge for subscriber access-did not reflect the full marginal
costs that the companies, and therefore society, actually incur, even if they
are the marginal costs of an inefficiently designed system. The first-best
resolution of this dilemma would be to set prices on that latter basis, and
to apply the penalty to the totality of their costs that the companies are
allowed to recover.y Reconciliation of the total revenues that would flow
from consistent marginal cost pricing and the aggregate revenue constraint
is the task of second-best, which we discuss below in Part V.
B. Collective Consumption Decisions
The proposition we have just enunciated may seem unjust. Why should
the humble POTS customer be required to pay a price set at marginal
costs that have been elevated by the demand for such exotic services as
actually using the telephone to place or receive calls, local or long-
distance, or to make possible high speed data transmission? Why not re-
flect the asserted differences in the costs of designing access systems suita-
ble respectively for local calling, long-distance calling, and more sophisti-
cated services in correspondingly differing flat monthly charges to
customers depending on the kind of service to which they wish to sub-
scribe?9" Some economists have recommended that regulatory commissions
estimate the costs of designing these several hypothetical systems, and pro-
pose that access costs be distributed among the respective classes of cus-
tomers in proportion to those separate costs-the same kind of alternative
justifiable expenditures or relative cost method that the Tennessee Valley
Authority used to apportion the costs of its multi-purpose river develop-
ment system among the several services it provided. 4 If such differentiated
91. See supra notes 38, 65, and 70.
92. It is possible that the dilemma would disappear as the companies, suitably penalized, mended
their ways, so that the discrepancy between the marginal costs they actually incur and marginal costs
under an efficiently designed system would disappear. To the extent, however, that the system design
is irreversible (or at least not quickly reversible), the efficient solution would be the one we have
described.
93. The same logic would dictate offering a flat monthly access charge equal to what the sub-
scriber loop would cost in a hypothetical system designed to minimize system costs if there were no
calling at all. This result is a true reductio ad absurdum: presumably that cost would be zero-and
so all the costs of the actual access system would have to be levied on usage-since there is no need for
an access system at all if there is to be no calling.
94. See, e.g., Melody Testimony, supra note 30, at 62-67.
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rates were confined to the flat monthly charge, they might do little eco-
nomic damage: because of the inelasticity of the demand for access, prices
both below and above marginal cost would not significantly affect
consumption. Moreover-setting aside the very large question of whether
its factual premises are sound 9"-the recommended departure from first-
best pricing might be attractive on equity grounds. The fact that it has
been proposed by economists should not, however, deceive anyone into
thinking that it provides a measure of economic cost.96
Moreover, our speculation that it would probably do little economic
damage is subject to two major qualifications. First, the lower charge for
POTS must not be financed by inefficiently raising the charges for usage:
that does do a great deal of damage. Second, it must be possible to make
such differentiations among customers at a cost low enough for it to be
possible to offer the lower-priced service without unfairly and inefficiently
burdening the others. It appears unlikely, however, that any such dif-
ferentiations are either economically or politically feasible."'
Competitive markets have the virtue of offering consumers a variety of
price and quality options, but that spectrum of offerings is not unlimited.
It is not economically feasible to provide all conceivable packages. For
example, there may be some automobile buyers who would prefer to buy
cars without bumpers or fenders, at a correspondingly reduced price; but
in view of the economies of producing standardized models, it probably
would actually be more costly to satisfy their idiosyncratic desires than to
supply them with the models preferred by the great majority of customers.
In that event, they have no legitimate complaint about not having
95. The factual premise appears not to be sound in the case of long-distance calling. Design of the
subscriber access network for that purpose is evidently no more costly than for "local service." In
these circumstances, the only possible purpose of this exercise (which would presumably require
blocking subscribers to "local service" from the long distance network) would be artificially to fashion
an inferior service to be offered on an explicitly subsidized basis.
96. As one of the authors has previously written about the Federal Power Commission:
The FPC was later prevailed on to accept a similar method, the 'relative cost method,' for
allocating the costs of production on joint-product leases between natural gas,'on the one hand,
and oil and various natural gas liquids, on the other, in order to ascertain a 'just and reasona-
ble' field price for the natural gas. The method involved distributing the joint costs of produc-
ing those same quantities in proportion to the actual costs of producing that same number of
barrels of crude oil on leases in which oil was produced in the absence or virtual absence of
natural gas, on the one hand, and that number of cubic feet of natural gas from virtually dry
gas leases on the other .. . .In advocating this method, at a later stage only for pricing gas
that had already been discovered and committed to pipeline purchasers, the present writer
emphasized that while it might be deemed to provide a just or a fair distribution of the joint
costs, it did not provide an economic measure of the separate costs.
I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 151.
97. It would apparently be costly to block subscribers to local service only from the long-distance
network; there might be very little demand for the service if the costs of blocking were incorporated in
the charge for it; and there might be objections on grounds of both efficiency and equity to imposing
those costs instead on the customers subscribing to the long-distance option.
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available to them, at a lower price, a stripped-down version that would
have to be custom-made.
The same constraints prevail in the provision of public utility services.
There is a great deal of internal subsidization among the great majority of
customers who subscribe to flat rate local telephone service; light users, or
subscribers who do all their calling off-peak, are forced to pay a uniform
charge based on average costs that are inflated by other subscribers who
do a great deal of talking during periods of peak demand on the system.
To the extent that the costs of metering to separate those two categories of
users are prohibitive, the light users have no legitimate complaint. The
same is true of purchasers of electric service who confine their consump-
tion to off-peak periods, yet who for the same reason cannot be offered a
lower price corresponding to the lower than average costs that their con-
sumption habits impose on the system.
Similarly, it may well be infeasible to supply the minority of subscrib-
ers who have no desire to be connected to the interexchange network, ei-
ther to place or to receive long-distance calls, with the limited service they
want except at costs that they themselves would regard as excessive. The
system may therefore have to be designed with the facilities and quality of
service that maximize the net benefits to all subscribers collectively. The
same reasoning may well justify such telephone company practices as pro-
viding subscribers with individual, dedicated access lines,98 regardless of
how much or how little they use them, and the recent conversions to digi-
tal electronic switching.
The kind of telephone network that we have, in short, inevitably repre-
sents a collective consumption decision. Because it would probably have
been impractical for telephone companies to offer two or more systems, of
varying capability, it became necessary to decide, in effect collectively,"9
which quality offered the largest differential between benefits and costs to
all subscribers together. The choice of a system suitable for long-distance
calling was almost certainly the correct one.1°0 It is worth recalling, in this
connection, that a large proportion of what typically goes under the rubric
98. This, it seems to us, is the likely answer to the complaint by Wilson about the injustice of
older people who seldom use their phones being compelled to pay the access costs of a system designed
for families with teenagers. Wilson, supra note 48, at 19. It might well cost the phone company much
more than it could possibly save if it were to try to match the kind of subscriber plant it extends in
different places to the varying and changing telephonic garrulousness of its transient and aging popu-
lation of subscribers.
99. We emphasize "in effect" because the "collective decision" to make certain options available
and others unavailable except at prohibitive cost will in most circumstances not require any single,
centralized decision. Instead, as in the case of the standardized automobile equipped with fenders, it
will emerge as the consequence of the sum total of individual purchase decisions in the market.
100. In fact, this choice was apparently made, at least in part, by the free choice of consumers
between telephone companies offering and not offering the option. See supra note 79.
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of "local calling," because it is embraced within the local charging system,
is itself long-distance, in the sense that it is interexchange rather than
intraexchange.10'
Discussion of whether people who want only "basic service" should
have to pay for an access system adapted also for long-distance has been
confused by uncritical assumptions about what constitutes "basic service,"
which we presumably want to make available to as many people as possi-
ble at the lowest possible price. Consumer advocates tend to equate it with
"local service." This equating of "basic service" and "local service" is
questionable, at best. In an important sense, the service that is basic is
attachment to the entire network, which conveys the ability to place and
receive calls everywhere and anywhere. It is no wonder that we think of
local calling as a necessity and long-distance as a luxury today, when most
subscribers pay nothing for individual local calls and pay for long-distance
calling by the minute and the mile at rates many times incremental cost. It
might well be argued, indeed, that the ability to telephone one's neighbor
is in a real sense less basic than to call someone on another exchange: one
can always let one's feet do the talking in the former case. A rural sub-
scriber's conception of "basic service" will for this reason be quite differ-
ent from that of an urban dweller. And the popular notion that the per-
centage of income that households spend on long-distance calling goes up
as their income rises is simply incorrect, even at present inflated toll
charges.' 2
C. The Problem of Aggrt'gation
A service-more precisely, what the economy prices as a single
service-may be more costly to supply to some customers than to others.
For example, the cost of providing access to the telephone network within
a city can vary substantially, depending (among other things) on the dis-
tance separating a customer from the closest central office. Just as it can
be inefficient to tailor services to idiosyncratic preferences, so it can also be
inefficient to tailor the price of some standard service to reflect all of the
variations in the circumstances of individual customers that may affect the
101. See supra text accompanying notes 45 and 46. This is not to say that we think all the
collective decisions that have been made about the design of the system have been correct. One of us
has expressed skepticism about the wisdom of our social decision to move from a standard of multi-
party to single-party telephone service. Kahn, supra note 8, at 151 n.67. Had we priced each to
consumers at its true economic cost, there might still be enough people subscribing to the former,
lower-cost service to keep that option more widely available than it now is, as a kind of lifeline, and it
might be unnecessary for us to look for ways of subsidizing service to low-income families in order to
keep them on the system. Instead, we subsidized the transformation by underpricing the more luxuri-
ous option, and as a result the multi-party option has become decreasingly available.
102. See infra note 155.
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cost of supplying it to them. The proposition that first-best principles call
for pricing each good or service at its marginal cost ignores the cost of
administering multiple separately-priced offerings. Realistically, first-best
efficiency necessarily entails some aggregation or bundling.OA
The pricing of telephone services involves two types of aggregation. One
is "rate averaging," the practice of charging the same price for a group of
services despite differences in the cost of supplying them. For example,
toll rates are typically uniform on a per mile basis, despite apparent econ-
omies of density, which produces lower unit costs on heavily used than on
lightly used routes. Similarly, telephone subscribers typically pay a basic
monthly charge that disregards differences in the costs of providing them
access, which depend on their distances from the nearest central office and
on whether the cable must be placed above or below the ground."04 The
other kind of aggregation is "bundling"-charging a joint price for a com-
bination of two or more services, rather than pricing each separately; the
familiar example we have already encountered is flat-rate local service,
whose single price covers both access and unlimited local calling.
These two types of aggregation have two features in common: both pro-
duce inefficient customer choices by providing misleading price signals;
but both save on metering and billing costs. For example, the uniform
price for all toll calls in a broad distance interval or time period that is
correct on average will inefficiently discourage calls in the group that are
less costly to provide (for example, calls on high-density routes during the
less busy part of the rate period), while inefficiently encouraging more
costly calls (for example, calls made on less-dense routes during the busy
hours). Similarly, flat-rate pricing of local service fails to deter subscribers
from making calls whose value is less than their marginal cost, and (if the
flat rate exceeds the cost of access) inefficiently discourages light users of
local calling from subscribing at all.
Disaggregated or unbundled pricing would eliminate these distortions,
but would entail additional costs of measurement, billing, and inconve-
nience to customers. It therefore produces an improvement in economic
efficiency only where the gain from improved price signals exceeds the
increase in those other costs. The case for price disaggregation is therefore
strongest when (a) aggregation conceals large cost differences among the
services that are bundled or uniformly priced; (b) demands are price-
elastic, so that customers would markedly alter their usage in response to
103. For a discussion of the relevant principles and their application in various contexts, see 1 A.
KAHN, supra note 6, at 83-86, 103-109.
104. There are exceptions. In some rural areas a "line extension charge" is added to the normal
access charge when the customer's premises are outside the primary service area, or when the terrain
makes access particularly costly (e.g., connecting a house perched on a mountain top).
Yale Journal on Regulation
more finely differentiated prices; and (c) the additional administrative
costs are small.
In the following discussion we apply these criteria to assess two major
aggregation issues confronting telephone companies and their regulators:
(1) whether to offer local measured service on either an optional or
mandatory basis; and (2) whether and how much to de-average various
rates both geographically and temporally-that is, on the basis of geo-
graphic differences in marginal costs and variations in marginal costs over
time.
1. Local Measured Service (LMS)
Most calling, by far, is local.105 A number of conclusions from the pre-
ceding analysis strongly suggest the desirability of charging for local ser-
vice on a measured basis, with a flat charge for access and a separate,
marginal cost-based charge for each local call:
* The fact that subscriber access and local calling are, in economic terms,
separate services, with separate marginal costs;
* Our view that access is more "basic" than unlimited local calling;
" The likelihood that the cost of providing an individual with access is
insensitive to usage, which dictates that it be priced separately on a flat or
a lump sum basis; and
* The unfairness, inherent in an exclusively flat rate option, of subscribers
who make few calls (especially on-peak) in effect subsidizing heavy users.
We will, in later discussions, recognize the following additional attrac-
tions of LMS:
* The possible desirability of recognizing differences in marginal sub-
scriber access cost from one group of customers to another;
105. In 1983, 84% of all call minutes on the Bell System's switched network were local, and 16%
were toll. P. HUBRR, supra note 57, at 2.3; cf the somewhat different estimate for 1984 at note 143
infra. One of the most curious aspects of the testimony of consumer advocates who contend that usage
increases access costs is that they have at the same time expressed hostility to the introduction of
LMS, presumably even on an optional basis. This hostility doubtless partly reflects the comparative
unfamiliarity of measured service to many subscribers, and uneasiness about their ability to restrain
either themselves or their families from running up large bills. These concerns could easily be accom-
modated by making the offer of measured service optional only.
The ultimate reason for the posture of consumer advocates is probably the suspicion that the tele-
phone companies are proposing the introduction of LMS in the hope that it will make it easier for
them eventually to raise basic subscriber rates for both access and local usage. According to this
scenario, they hope to begin with the charge for the more luxurious flat rate service, while holding
down the access portion of the LMS rate. Then, once they have succeeded by this strategy in inducing
large numbers of subscribers to move over to the measured option, they will raise the flat monthly
portion of that rate as well.
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* The possible desirability, whether on ground of externalities or because
of social and political considerations, of offering access alone at a subsi-
dized price, preferably selectively, in order to keep attached to the tele-
phone system people who might otherwise drop off; and
* The possible need for pricing access and local calls at varying markups
above their respective marginal costs in order to provide the telephone
companies with adequate revenues.
A virtue of competition is that it unbundles services and offers custom-
ers a variety of price and quality options, reflecting their respective costs
to society. The analogy in the telephone case would be to give people who
are willing to exercise restraint in the costs they impose on the
system-whether by restricting the volume of their calling or concentrat-
ing it in off-peak periods-the opportunity to keep down their bills corre-
spondingly. Offering this option would also drastically reduce the cross-
subsidizing of heavy users at peak hours by light users.
This listing of the attractions of LMS merely returns us, however, to
the other side of the equation-the costs of such a disaggregation of
services-and the three factors that determine the balance of costs and
benefits: the extent of variation in costs concealed in the aggregation, the
elasticities of demand, and the costs of administration. And these, it ap-
pears, combine to make the narrow economic case for LMS an extremely
modest one.
The reasons that LMS is not more attractive have to do with the rela-
tively small and probably declining proportion of telephone company costs
that vary with usage and are therefore susceptible to being saved by
charging for each call (which is another way of saying that the variation
in the costs of serving low and high-usage customers is slight), and, sec-
ond, the relatively low elasticity of demand for local calling. Some critics
have contended, therefore, that the savings LMS is likely to induce are too
small to justify the costs of administering it.106 They also suggest that a
truly cost-based measured service option would not be very attractive, be-
cause the cost-justified differential between the charges for access alone
and for flat rate service would be relatively small: the major costs of pro-
viding "local service" are the NTS costs of the access network itself.
Moreover, the costs that LMS would enable the telephone companies
and subscribers to save, on the one side, and of administering LMS pric-
ing, on the other, are not truly commensurable; a dollar of saving would
106. Selwyn, Perspectives on Usage-Sensitive Pricing, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 7, 1981, at 15.
For a series of empirical studies, see Economics & Technology, Inc., A Multi-Part Study of Local
Measured Service (1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
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not justify incurring a dollar of cost. The reason is that metering and
billing costs are a dead weight social loss; their only economic value is the
savings they make possible. In contrast, any savings in telephone company
costs and customers' bills are not an undiluted social gain: in order to
measure the net benefit, it is necessary to deduct from them the value to
consumers of the calls they forego under the influence of price, or the
inconvenience of shifting them from peak to off-peak. 107
The foregoing assessment of the three determining factors we have
identified may be unduly pessimistic. The costs of measurement and bill-
ing are far lower on modern electronic than on older types of switches.
Moreover, the changeover by the Bell operating companies (BOCs) to
ESS has been greatly accelerated by the requirement of the Modified Fi-
nal Judgment (MFJ) in the AT&T antitrust suit that they equip them-
selves to offer all interexchange carriers equal quality access to their local
networks.' o8
Likewise, the elasticity of demand for local calling in the aggregate is
less pertinent than the elasticity of substitution between calling on-peak
and off-peak. The latter will be higher than the former: people who may
find it difficult to dispense with local calls entirely may nevertheless be
induced by marginal cost-based price differentials to shift the timing of
some to off-peak.' 09
As for the small possibility of savings because of the relatively low pro-
portion of total telephone company costs, on average, that are sensitive to
usage: first, the ratio is higher than average for calls on-peak, when addi-
tional calls necessitate additional switching and trunk capacity; and, sec-
ond, it will be higher also for heavy-calling than for light-calling custom-
ers. A cost-justified differential between the charges for measured and flat
rate service that would be unattractive if it reflected only the traffic-
sensitive costs imposed on the system by the average call and average cus-
tomer will inevitably be more attractive as it comes to reflect the costs
imposed by the heavier users on-peak, who are most apt to stay with the
flat rate option.
107. For a fuller explanation, see Kahn, Applications of Economics to Utility Rate Structures,
Pun. Urni.. FOR'., Jan. 19, 1978, at 10-11; Economics & Technolgy, Inc., supra note 106, at 14-20
& app. 1.
108. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 227 (D.D.C. 1982), affd,
460 U.S. 1241 (1983). The MFJ exempts the BOCs from this requirement where they can demon-
strate that it would cause them extreme hardship. The Department of Justice reported to the District
Court on October 31, 1986 that 70% of the Bell company lines had been so equipped, and that it
regarded them as in substantial compliance with the requirement. BOCs Rate Well on Equal Access,
TI.,:PHONY, Nov. 10, 1986, at 17.
109. Selwyn, supra note 106, recognizes the relevance of the elasticity of substitution, but con-
tends it is likely to be inadequate to generate benefits of LMS sufficient to offset its costs.
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Once an LMS option is introduced, that cost differential should
increase over time. The reason is that a newly-introduced option at rate
differentials reflecting the cost differentials in, say, the first year of its
availability will appeal only to the very low-volume callers on-peak. As
they start dropping flat rate service, the remaining subscribers will be the
ones for whom the variable costs of usage constitute an above-average per-
centage of the total cost. The process of attrition of the flat rate service
group should be progressive; as the differential between the two rates is
adjusted to the now-higher average usage by the remaining subscribers to
that service, more relatively low-volume users should transfer to LMS,
further increasing the ratio of traffic-sensitive to non-traffic-sensitive costs
of those remaining on flat-rate, and therefore further widening the cost-
justified difference between the two charges.
In the final analysis, however, the efficiency of LMS is an empirical
question: do the gains exceed the costs? The few attempts to answer it
have produced divergent-but, probably more significantly, quite
modest-results. 1 The recent conclusions reached by Rolla Park and
Bridger Mitchell are particularly arresting. After presenting the results of
complex estimations that show LMS offering very modest welfare im-
provements over flat rate pricing, they nevertheless conclude that it is un-
likely in practice to improve efficiency in most circumstances. The reason
for their negative conclusion is the administrative infeasibility of pricing
local calls in a manner even remotely approximating the ideal. Economi-
cally ideal prices, they point out, would vary from one telephone exchange
to another, from one moment to the next, depending on the instantaneous
relationship between demand and capacity in each; such a system, they
find, would produce significant welfare gains. The only administratively
feasible pricing system, however, would, they assume, involve uniform
prices, differentiating at most three periods-perhaps peak, shoulder peak,
and off-peak-within each of which the relationship between demand and
110. Bridger Mitchell's 1978 study produced estimates of welfare changes ranging from -1.6% to
6.0% consequent on switching residential customers from flat-rate to LMS under a variety of cost
assumptions. The percentages are the estimated changes in the sum total of consumer and producer
surplus from local telephone service-a total representing the difference between the value of that
service to consumers and its cost to producers. Mitchell, Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service,
68 AM. E:ON. REV. 517 (1978). For an explanation of the concept, see supra text accompanying
notes 38 and 39.
Lewis Perl in 1985 estimated that a similar switch for both residential and business customers in
Kentucky, with local rates set so as to maximize welfare, would produce a welfare improvement of
approximately 0.11%; this included the benefit, of a slight increase in subscription to telephone service
resulting from the lower price for access alone entailed in the offer of LMS. The modesty of the
improvement is perhaps more clearly suggested by the fact that Per[ estimated it at 1.0 million dollars
per year (for Kentucky), whereas he estimated that the welfare gain for Kentucky from reducing toll
rates to marginal cost would be 44.6 million dollars per year. L. Perl, LMS in Kentucky, supra note
21.
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capacity would in fact vary widely. Those prices, they judge, would cause
so much uneconomic discouragement of calling during those times falling
within the designated peak period when-and at those exchanges
where-in fact marginal opportunity or congestion costs are very small,
and uneconomic encouragement of calling at "off-peak" times when in
fact marginal costs are high, as on balance-taking into account also the
costs of administering such a system-to do more harm than good."' 1
None of these studies provides conclusive evidence of the efficiency of
local measured service."' One problem is the sketchiness of our knowl-
edge of cost and demand conditions. Estimates of the marginal cost of local
calls by time of day have varied widely. There is even greater uncertainty
on the demand side. As we have already observed, the price elasticity of
demand for local calls is low, perhaps in the neighborhood of -0.2."' This
implies that any efficiency gain from LMS depends heavily on customers'
willingness to substitute off-peak for peak-period local calls, about which
even less is known. More empirical attention must be devoted to local call
price elasticities, the cost of local calls, and the cost and feasibility of ad-
ministering more complex pricing systems. In the interim, companies and
commissions have to decide how aggressively they should pursue the offer
of LMS.
Even if we can at this time be only agnostic about the efficiency advan-
tages of LMS, in our view its other numerous benefits" 4 tip the balance
in favor of making it widely available in exchanges equipped with elec-
111. R. PARK & B. MITCHElL, OPTIMAL PEAK-LOAD PRICING FOR LOCAL TELEPHONE CALLS
23-31 (1986) (published by the Rand Corporation). In addition, they cite the fact that the costs of
incremental capacity have declined with the introduction of digital electronics and fiber-optic
transmission-in effect alluding to the first determining factor we have identified: the lower the mar-
ginal costs of usage, the smaller the differences in the costs of providing different customers with the
fiat rate bundle.
112. The early Mitchell study assumed that local calls would be priced uniformly, Mitchell,
supra note 109, at 518, yet the major gain from measured service is likely to be from differentiating
the price of local calls according to whether they are made in the peak period, when costs are much
higher. The Park & Mitchell study, supra note 111, ignores the second-best gains in other service
markets permitted by LMS when strict marginal cost pricing would not provide the company with
adequate revenues and regulators insist on inefficiently low basic service charges. Also, it was limited
to a small exchange served by a single office. Yet many "local" calls are indistinguishable from long-
distance calls. See supra note 45 and acompanying text. The demand for these longer-distance "local"
calls tends to be more elastic, and the calls themselves more costly to provide; both of these factors
would cause the Park & Mitchell analysis to understate the benefits of LMS in a more typical setting.
For discussions of this and other considerations that may have led Park and Mitchell to an unwar-
rantedly pessimistic assessment of LMS, see M. Koschat, D. Lehman & E. Sieff, A Preliminary
Analysis of the Rand LMS Study (Nov. 28, 1986) (unpublished manuscript available from Bell Com-
munications Research); W. Shew, Pricing Local Calls: How Much Imperfection is Perfect? (speech
given at Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, sponsored by National Economic Re-
search Associates, Phoenix, Arizona, March 6, 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
113. See supra note 40.
114. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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tronic switches. An appealing idea may be to offer customers a choice
between flat- and measured-rate service, with the measured-rate prices
reflecting the additional administrative costs. This shifts the responsibility
for determining whether measured service is worthwhile to the customer,
who may be in a better position to make the assessment."' It has the
further advantage of preserving the option of flat-rate service for those
customers who, quite apart from price considerations, regard it as supe-
rior, perhaps because it eliminates all uncertainty about the size of the
local service portion of their bills, perhaps because of the attractiveness,
however illusory, of "free" local calls.'"
2. Disaggregation by De-averaging: Variations in Marginal Access
Costs
In principle, every single transaction or taking of service by one cus-
tomer at one moment in time will have its unique marginal cost. To call
attention to that fact is to recognize the inevitability of grouping custom-
ers, transactions and time periods, and pricing these groups of transactions
at average marginal costs. The illustration of this phenomenon that we
pursue here is the ubiquitous presence in communications of spare sub-
scriber access capacity.
11 7
There are two polar occasions for this phenomenon. The first is when
the spare capacity is in fact efficient, because its incremental benefits ex-
ceed its incremental costs-that is to say, because it ensures the optimal
quality and reliability of service at minimum cost. In this event, the mar-
115. If customers are to make an efficient choice, the measured rate prices must reflect the addi-
tional administrative costs of providing that option. But some portion of those costs might be fixed,
varying with neither the number of subscribers to local measured service nor the number of local calls
they make. The presence of these fixed costs means that, even if measured services are considered an
option, the regulator must still form some a priori estimate of whether it would be worthwhile, and
make some sort of "collective decision" about whether it should be offered.
Moreover, optional LMS is likely to introduce an adverse self-selection bias. Light users of flat-rate
service may be drawn to measured service merely to avoid subsidizing heavier users of flat-rate ser-
vice. Adverse self-selection could be mitigated by careful tariff design, but this would require collect-
ing information on individuals' demands for local calls. For a discussion of some of the problems that
optional LMS would raise, see Park & Mitchell, Repression Effects of Mandatory Versus Optional
Local Measured Telephone Service, in CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION IN THE
1980s 121 (H. Trebling ed. 1981) (proceedings of the Institute of Public Utilities, 12th Annual Con-
ference, MSU Public Utilities Paters); W. Shew, supra note 112.
116. More people opt for flat-rate service than can be readily explained in monetary terms; some
flat-rate customers persistently make so few calls that their telephone bills would be lower under
measured-rate service. One possible reason, in addition to the ones we have mentioned, may be simple
ignorance.
117. The principles we discuss here are equally applicable to other kinds of spare capacity as
well. We concentrate on the subscriber access plant because that is the locus of the most intensely
contested issue. It has been in opposition to proposed increases in the basic residential access charge
that the asserted difference between marginal and average costs has been most widely cited.
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ginal costs of the spare capacity should unequivocally be recovered in
price.
This case embraces the consideration we have already mentioned,"'8
that the minimum-cost expansion path will involve introducing additional
capacity in lumps. In this event, short-run marginal costs will vary from
below to above long-run cost, from the time when the new block of capac-
ity is installed to the time when the next one comes into service.
Whether it will be feasible and desirable to recognize those fluctuations
in prices will depend heavily on their amplitude and duration. If the cy-
cles are short and, in addition, vary from one part of the system to the
other, pricing on the basis of long-run incremental costs is likely to re-
present the most efficient feasible course: The superior efficiency of pric-
ing at short-run marginal costs will have been outweighed by the costs
(including inconvenience and confusion) of disaggregation. If, on the other
hand, the cycles are likely to be protracted, it might be extremely ineffi-
cient not to reflect them in price. Consider, for example, the practice of
telephone companies installing extra wire pairs in the distribution cable
terminating at subscribers' premises, precisely because the marginal cost
of installing extra wire pairs is very low, in order to accommodate future
demand. The general practice of pricing the second line at the same rate
as the first seems a likely source of considerable inefficiency, because on
the one hand its marginal cost is very low, and on the other, the demand
for a second line is probably much more elastic than for the first.1 9
The other occasion for the presence of spare capacity will be where
capacity is genuinely excessive. This could be because of mistakes-for
example, overestimation of demand-or because of the distorted incentive
of a utility company to "gold plate" its facilities when it is regulated on a
rate base/rate of return basis.' 2 ° Whether or not the companies should be
entitled to recover those costs, they manifestly would not be reflected in
the first-best efficient prices of the affected services.
The importance of the phenomenon of spare access capacity will de-
pend, among other things, on the extent to which stranded capacity can be
placed at the disposal of other customers. This fungibility is likely to vary
substantially from one time and place to another. Conceivably, one of us
has suggested elsewhere,' phone lines abandoned in center cities, with
high vacancy rates, may have no such alternative possible employments;
118. See supra text accompanying note 85.
119. We are indebted to Roger Noll for this suggestion.
120. See supra note 87.
121. Kahn, supra note 8, at 147; see also Kahn, The Next Steps in Telecommunications Regula-
tion and Research, PuB. Urn.. FORT., July 19, 1984, at 16-17 (raising this and other problems of
aggregation).
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their marginal opportunity costs and first-best prices would therefore be
low. The same might be true of access lines planned for large amounts of
Centrex service whose customers have been lost because they have in-
stalled their own PBXs.
In new residential or business centers, in contrast, marginal costs are
likely to be much higher, reflecting the lesser density of subscribers, the
greater average length of distribution lines, and the effects of inflation
over the last decade. The same might be true in cities where existing con-
duits are already congested, and wherever new cable must be placed
underground.
In principle, these differences in access costs suggest the possible desira-
bility of disaggregating charges. For example, it would apparently be
much more efficient to impose higher flat monthly charges for a sub-
scriber's first telephone line than for the second line. And regulators might
well permit telephone companies to charge a lower price for service in
areas expected to have excess capacity for a long time.
None of these considerations constitutes a case for imposing non-traffic-
sensitive costs on usage: they argue only for varying the flat access charges
among different categories of customers.
D. Externalities
The simplest and most familiar case for pricing residential access or
basic service well below marginal cost is that subscription to telephone
service yields benefits to others. When an individual connects to the net-
work, it increases the value of the service to others, because it increases
the number of people they can reach by phone. In deciding whether to
take phone service, however, a consumer tends to ignore the benefit his or
her subscription confers on others. So, from a social perspective, if service
is priced at marginal cost too few people will subscribe.
The theoretical basis for subsidy in this situation is straightforward.
Economic efficiency requires that the marginal value of each service be
equated to its marginal cost. In the absence of externalities, price must
therefore equal marginal cost: in deciding whether to subscribe, the cus-
tomer will compare the price with the value to himself. But when (for
example) telephone subscription confers benefits on others, its social mar-
ginal benefit is the sum of (a) the value of the service to the marginal
subscriber and (b) the value to other subscribers of that individual being
connected to the network. A price set at marginal cost will discourage
some subscriptions whose total benefits-to the subscriber and
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others-would have exceeded the cost. The economically efficient price
would therefore have to be below marginal cost. 2
Consumer advocates generally contend that the external benefits are
quite large, and so justify pricing basic telephone service well below mar-
ginal cost. The assertion is usually based on the observation that, since
telephone service would be worthless if only one individual subscribed to
it, the external value of a second subscriber must be large. What is rele-
vant to pricing, however, is the external value not of a second or third
subscriber, but of the marginal subscriber when penetration is, rather,
eighty-five or ninety percent. 23
It is simply not clear on a priori grounds how the large increase in
telephone penetration over the last half century has affected the external
value of adding a marginal subscriber to the network. On the one side, it
would tend to increase as subscribership approached universality, because
the larger the body of existing subscribers, the greater the number of ben-
eficiaries. On the other hand, it could be that, as subscription has ex-
ceeded 90%, marginal subscribers have come to consist disproportionately
of people relatively isolated from society generally, to whose hypothetical
addition to the network existing subscribers would impute progressively
smaller values.
It is possible to extract from Perl's study of the residential demand for
access an estimate that, in an exchange comprising 10,000 households, the
external value of another subscriber is $2.60 per month when penetration
is eighty-five percent, and rises to $3.00 per month at a penetration of
ninety-five percent. 2 ' These estimates should of course be accepted, at
best, as suggesting only rough orders of magnitude. At the same time they
imply that the marginal externality benefits of even the relatively small
122. The question of how far below is a complicated one. At a first approximation, it would
presumably be sufficiently below to keep on the system all those for whom the private plus the exter-
nal benefits of subscription exceed the marginal cost. A basic charge set uniformly at that level would,
however, be likely to encourage subscriptions that do not meet that test, unliss all potential subscrib-
ers would confer equal benefits on others. In principle, therefore, the first-best solution might require
discrimination in the basic charge.
In any event, the market failure consequent on setting the charge at marginal cost will undoubtedly
be remedied to some extent by voluntary private arrangements, diminishing the need therefore actu-
ally to reduce the price: potential recipients of the external benefits-parents of impecunious children,
for example-can to some extent be counted upon to defray part or all of the cost of subscribing on
behalf of people they want to be able to reach or be reached by.
123. The demand for basic service being highly price-inelastic, it appears that even a doubling of
the basic charge would still leave penetration rates within that range. L. Perl, Residential Demand for
Telephone Service 2 (Dec. 16, 1983) (unpublished study on file with the authors).
124. Id. at 30-36. Using Census observations on whether individual households have telephones,
Perl estimated the demand for basic service as a function of price, the number of subscribers in the
local calling area, and demographic characteristics of the household. He found, as one would expect,
that the probability of a household having a phone was higher (i.e., the value of service greater) the
greater the number of other subscribers in the local area.
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percentage of subscribers who would drop off the system if basic service
charges were substantially increased cannot be ignored, even on grounds
of economic efficiency alone-an inference that is reinforced, of course, if
one takes into account the desirability on social, political, and income-
distributional grounds of keeping telephone service widely affordable. In
light of the tendency of some recent empirical investigations to produce
estimates of the marginal or current costs of subscriber access on the order
of only one-half or less of the more familiar twenty to thirty dollar esti-
mates of associated revenue requirements,'25 it appears that current
charges may not on average be as far below economically first-best levels
as has heretofore been widely believed.' 26
Lest this observation be misconstrued, we must emphasize that, for rea-
sons we will elaborate below in Part V, the economic case for much
higher basic monthly charges remains extremely compelling. But as our
consignment of the demonstration to that section suggests, the case may
rest more on second-best considerations than on wide discrepancies be-
tween present charges and marginal costs, as modified by marginal
externalities.
E. The Proper Recognition of Accelerated Depreciation
The increasingly competitive character of the telephone business has in-
creased the rate at which assets depreciate, in economic terms. Under the
previous regime, the monopolist could control the introduction of new
technologies; typical depreciation rates based on estimated useful lives of
30 and 35 years could well have been accurate. In addition, the telephone
companies presumably found it in their interest to accept such slow rates,
because they entailed a correspondingly slower rate of decline (actually, a
more rapid rate of increase) in their rate base, on which they generally
earned something more than the cost of capital.
The introduction of competition and acceleration of innovation clearly
require a more rapid depreciation of existing facilities, reflecting the more
125. See supra note 76.
126. This conclusion calls for much closer empirical investigation than it has so far received.
Consider, however, the following reconstruction, based on 1984 estimates by the New England Tele-
phone Company: current cost of residential subscriber access, 13 dollars per month; marginal cost per
minute of local intraexchange calls, 1.1 cents on-peak, 0.1 cent off-peak; marginal cost per minute of
local interexchange calls, 1.3 cents and 0.1 cent, respectively; and the average residential flat-rate
customer made 512 minutes of local calls per month. Assume, then, that the (average) marginal cost of
local calls was 0.75 cents and that all residential subscribers took flat rate service. The (average)
marginal cost of serving them would have been 13 dollars plus (0.75 cents X 512) or $16.84. If the
Perl estimates of marginal external benefits of subscribership are roughly accurate, it appears they
would justify the major portion of the difference between that figure and the $12.50 average price of
residential service that year. See L. Perl, supra note 123.
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rapid economic obsolescence of existing plant. 2 ' Competition also changed
the motivations of the telephone companies correspondingly. In these al-
tered circumstances, the overvaluation of assets on their books 2 ' became a
source of intense concern, for two reasons. First, because regulators forced
them to set their rates at levels incorporating capital charges on the in-
flated book values, the companies found themselves handicapped in com-
peting with rivals using modern low-cost technology. Second, it raised
questions about their ability ultimately to recover their sunk
investments. 129
It is not clear whether or to what extent increased depreciation rates
necessitated by the introduction of competition may properly be regarded
as a real increase in economic costs rather than a belated recognition that
those costs had previously been underestimated. The point is that invest-
ment and the true economic value of telephone company plant (the decline
in which is the measure of economic depreciation) should always have
been based on the cost of the most efficient available alternatives. So long
as monopoly prevailed, neither regulators nor the companies themselves
were forced to recognize that decline fully in realistic depreciation charges
and rates.
On the other hand, monopoly may have retarded the process of innova-
tion itself, and therefore the true economic depreciation of existing assets.
Moreover, the process may we!l have been self-reinforcing or self-
justifying: low depreciation rates tend to discourage regulated public utili-
ties from replacing economically obsolete but still incompletely depreciated
facilities, for fear that, once replaced, they will be dropped from the rate
base; and the slower rate of innovation in turn could have lent apparent
127. The FCC recognized the change and prescribed more rapid depreciation in In re Amend-
ment of Part 31, 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980). But see Louisiana Pub. Ser. Comm'n v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 1890 (1986) (overturning FCC's claim that the Communications Act gave
it authority to impose its represcribed depreciation rates on states for recognition in the charges they
set for intrastate services).
128. The roughly 80% ratio of net to gross book value of telephone company assets contrasted
with 60% to 70% in more competitive industries.
129. There have been some recent far-sighted agreements between Bell companies and state regu-
lators that have mitigated the problem. Taking advantage of the sharp decline in the cost of capital
and the impending reduction in corporate income tax rates, the companies accepted lower rates of
return, the commissions refrained from demanding corresponding rate decreases, and the companies
were permitted to use the windfalls to write down their overvalued assets-i.e., to make good a large
portion of their accumulated depreciation reserve deficiencies. For examples in Maryland and Penn-
sylvania, see TFLECOMM. REP., Sept. 22, 1986, at 11 (Maryland); TELECOMM. REP., Sept. 15, 1986,
at 2 (Pennsylvania). If the companies would in any event have been entitled ultimately to recover their
investments, customers will in these circumstances be rewarded for sacrificing present rate reductions
by future reductions in the carrying charges on the diminished rate base. In other words, they will in
effect earn a return on their foregone rate reductions equal to the return the companies would other-
wise have been allowed on their equivalently larger rate bases.
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justification to the long estimated service lives and low depreciation rates
of existing equipment.1"'
The proper recognition of accelerated depreciation has two conceptually
quite separate aspects. The first has to do with the inadequacy of past
depreciation rates, which have left the telephone companies with assets
grossly overvalued on their books. 3 The question here is to what extent
the companies are entitled to recovery of these sunk costs, and to what
extent that recovery requires second-best pricing. If the companies have
been regulated on an original cost or prudent investment basis, they can
make a strong case that they are entitled to recover all of those costs,
except to the extent it can be demonstrated that they were imprudent in
incurring them. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the question is
one of fairness to investors, it is necessary to ask also whether it is fair to
permit full recovery of the sunk costs entirely from the diminishing resid-
uum of captive ratepayers, whose demand alone may be sufficiently in-
elastic to permit it.
The second aspect relates to future depreciation, which is clearly part
of long-run marginal costs,"3 2 and therefore properly reflected in economi-
cally efficient prices. But in prices of which services? Specifically, are
these higher costs properly incorporated in the charges for POTS? If they
are the consequence of the introduction of competition, it would seem
neither economically efficient nor equitable for them to be levied on the
monopoly service. It would seem, rather, that they would constitute part
of the incremental costs of providing the competitive services, and should
be borne by them alone.
We have already enunciated the applicable principle: If the accelerated
incorporation of new technology in new investments is economically
efficient-or, even if inefficient, not reversible"'3 -then the marginal costs
130. See I A. KAHN, supra note 6, at 117-22, for a fuller explanation of the principle. For an
assertion that it did in fact apply in the telephone case, see Irwin, The Telecommunications Industry,
in THE SIRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 274 (W. Adams ed., 7th ed. 1986).
There is some uncertainty about the factual premise underlying this deduction. According to
AT&T ENGINEERING ECONOMY 157 (3d ed. 1977), when an item of plant is retired, both the plant
account and the accumulated depreciation account are reduced by its original cost. It also states that
total assets equal total plant minus accumulated depreciation. If these statements properly describe the
universal regulatory practice, retirement of incompletely depreciated plant would not, in fact, deprive
companies of a return on the unrecovered portion of that investment. See also W. BOLTER & D.
IRWIN, DEPRECIATION REFORM: A CRUCIAL STEP IN TRANSFORMING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TO A
FREE MARKET (1980) (commissioned by GTE) (arguing that both an accelerating rate of technologi-
cal innovation and competition have made historic depreciation policies progressively unrealistic).
131. See supra note 74. The $25 billion estimated overvaluation is over and above the $7.3 billion
of writeoffs that AT&T Communications took on its assets, mainly in customer premises equipment,
after divestiture. Wrong Number: AT&T's Earnings Shocker and What It Means, BARRON'S, Oct.
24, 1983, at 15-28.
132. If investment decisions are efficient, these costs will equal short-run marginal costs as well.
133. See supra note 92.
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of the various services are what they are; the fact that people who want
only POTS may not benefit from the new technology " " is irrelevant to the
determination of the respective marginal costs imposed on the economy
when they decide to subscribe to POTS or other more sophisticated
services.
These principles are clearly easier to enunciate in a priori terms than
to apply in practice. The efforts of the California Public Utilities Com-
mission to assess the merits of Pacific Bell's requested represcription of
depreciation rates and amortization of past undercollections illustrates the
kind of quagmire of claims and counterclaims into which the attempt to
apply them is likely to lead." We confess to having emerged from a read-
ing of the record of that proceeding in a state of profound skepticism over
the possibility of successfully adapting the traditional system of public
utility regulation to the new environment of turbulent competition. The
primary reason for deregulation is the compulsion that competition exerts
on managements to engage in bold, risk-taking innovation. "  To subject
such initiatives to regulatory second-guessing is to defeat that objective.
And yet, to complete the dilemma, the case for regulation is the perceived
need to protect from exploitation captive ratepayers who are inadequately
protected by competition; and that surely requires regulatory determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the costs that companies propose to pass on
to them.
The essential solution to this dilemma created by partial deregulation, it
seems to us, is in one way or another to break the link between the prices
to the monopoly customers and the revenues and costs ascribed to the com-
petitive operations. As long as the regulated prices continue to be set, di-
rectly or indirectly, on the basis of total company costs and revenues, or on
the basis of some continuing process of allocation of cost between regu-
lated and unregulated operations, there will always be the danger, in
principle, of the former subsidizing the latter. In those circumstances, con-
scientious regulators will not be able to refrain from setting floors under
the competitive prices, as well as ceilings over the putatively monopolistic
ones, and second guessing the companies' investment decisions, as they are
doing in California today.
134. But on this factual question, see supra text accompanying notes 64 and 65.
135. In re Application of Pacific Bell § I, No. 85-03-078 (Aug. 21, 1985) (opinion on capital
recovery/depreciation issues); see also supra note 65.
136. For a forceful exposition of the thesis that this clash between the imperatives of technology
and of regulation ultimately dooms continued state regulation, see M. Irwin, The Demise of State
Telecommunications Regulation 11 (Apr. 30, 1985) (presented at 14th Annual Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference) (arguing that "state public utility commissions are today's castles; tech-
nology is the gunpowder") (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (published in revised
form as Irwin, The Demise of State Telecommunications Regulation, TELECOMM., Dec. 1986, at 70).
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V. The Applicable Principles: Second-Best
It appears that first-best prices of telephone services are unlikely to pro-
vide the revenues to which the telephone companies are entitled under
traditional regulatory principles, for some combination of the following
reasons. First, economies of scale may in important parts of the business
cause marginal costs to fall short of average costs. Second, regulatorily
permissible capital charges are based on book values of assets that far
exceed current replacement costs reflecting the latest technology. Since the
discrepancy between book values and the capital costs of reproducing these
services with current technology is evidently enormous,"'7 it appears this
is the preponderant factor. Finally, the external benefits of subscribership
would call for pricing subscriber access below the marginal cost of provid-
ing it.
In view of the increasing uncertainty about the extent to which, or even
whether, subscriber access charges (under LMS) or flat rate local service
charges fall short of their marginal costs,1 8 the present gross overcharg-
ing of long-distance calling 8 9 and evidently of local calling as well, under
LMS,"'O both strongly suggest that first-best prices would for these vari-
ous reasons fail to produce sufficient revenues.' A reflection of sub-
scribership externalities in basic charges below marginal costs would fur-
ther exacerbate the discrepancy.
A. Second-Best Pricing of Independent Products
Ignoring for the moment the interdependence of demands for telephone
services, the first approximation to a resolution of this dilemma with mini-
mum loss of economic efficiency is by now familiar in the regulatory liter-
ature; its purport for the pricing issues with which this paper is concerned
is fundamental. The formula-named for its original expositor, Frank P.
137. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. We make no attempt in this Article to assess the
prudence of the original outlays and therefore the extent to which the companies may not be entitled
to recover them under traditional regulatory principles. To the extent, moreover, that the companies'
current investment decisions indeed are inefficient, as critics maintain, and portions of the associated
carrying charges are therefore disallowed, this too would reduce the size of the required markups
above marginal costs.
138. See supra note 76.
139. See supra note 21.
140. One reason for this is that local usage charges are often not differentiated by time of day, and
when they are, the off-peak price is typically set well above marginal cost, which is close to zero.
According to L. Perl, LMS in Kentucky, supra note 21, LMS usage charges for peak and off-peak
service in Kentucky were 2.7 and 1.5 cents per minute; the respective marginal costs were 0.837 and
zero cents per minute.
141. That is to say, if we had firm reason to believe that the overcharging of usage and other
services relative to their marginal costs were no more than necessary to offset an equivalent under-
charging of subscriber access relative to its marginal cost, we could not dismiss the possibility that
first-best pricing of all services would be consistent with total revenue requirements.
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Ramsey-calls for markups above the marginal costs inversely propor-
tional to the elasticities of demand for the several services, in order to elicit
the requisite increase in total net revenues.1" Manifestly, the less elastic
the demand for a service, the larger the markup above marginal cost it
will accept while minimizing the consequent inefficient discouragement of
consumption. Conversely, the greater the demand elasticity, the smaller
the markup sufficient to produce proportionately equal damage.
The historic pattern of telephone pricing obviously conflicts violently
with that prescription. It imposes the largest markup above marginal cost
on long-distance calling, the service whose demand is generally believed to
be the most elastic, and the smallest markup-quite conceivably, on aver-
age, a negative markup-on subscribership itself, the demand for which is
the least elastic.' 4  Moreover, it recovers as much as forty percent of the
total revenue requirements of subscriber plant costs from the ten percent
or so1" of total calls represented by long-distance usage, the most
demand-elastic service.145 It is this perverse pattern of markups, far more
than the mere necessity for moving from first- to second-best, that ex-
plains the enormous welfare losses caused by the present price
structure. 146
The standard formula for Ramsey pricing assumes a monopoly sup-
plier. The competition in telecommunications markets is likely to alter the
prices that satisfy the Ramsey principle. How it alters them will depend
on whether regulation is confined to the incumbent firm or extended to
the competitive entrants as well. 47
Limiting application of the Ramsey rule to the incumbent (or domi-
nant) firm is, in principle, less efficient than comprehensive Ramsey
142. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). See also Baumol
& Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 265-83 (1970).
143. See supra note 40.
144. The figure in 1984 was 8.5%. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, STATISTICS OF COM-
MUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS table 7 (1985). Cf. note 105 supra (giving somewhat different
estimate for minutes of calling in 1983).
145. We see no reason to doubt the showing of the statistics that, at the respective prices prevail-
ing during the periods studied and largely continuing today, the demand for toll calling is markedly
more elastic than for local calling. The present relative markups on these two services and on pure
access therefore reverse the order required by Ramsey principles. It seems highly possible, however,
that it is only at their present, economically indefensible respective rates that the demand for long
distance calling is so much more elastic than for local. At rates more closely resembling their respec-
tive, apparently very low marginal costs, see supra notes 21 and 140, the two elasticities might not
differ much.
146. For example, according to the estimates by L. Perl, supra note 38, at 15, uniform pricing at
marginal cost would have produced an annual welfare gain of 5.5 billion dollars in 1984 dollars;
moving to second-best, but with optimal markups, would still have produced a gain of 5.1 billion
dollars as compared with the results produced by the prices actually in effect.
147. For a detailed discussion of these alternatives, see Braeutigam, Optimal Pricing with In-
termodal Competition, AM. ECON. REV. 38 (1979).
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pricing. When entrants are unregulated, their prices restrain the dominant
firm's ability to resolve a revenue deficiency by large markups on services
whose market demand is relatively inelastic. Since competition limits the
ability of the firm to concentrate its markups in markets where the de-
mand is relatively inelastic, larger markups become necessary in relatively
elastic markets, where the consequent distortions are more costly. 48 In
contrast, comprehensive application of Ramsey pricing can efficiently re-
quire every firm to charge a relatively high price for services whose mar-
ket demand is relatively inelastic. This does not mean that comprehensive
Ramsey pricing is necessarily preferable, however, since its implementa-
tion requires more extensive information, and there may be-indeed, we
believe there are in telecommunications-other, more compelling consider-
ations that favor continuing to exempt entrants from price regulation.
If Ramsey pricing is limited to the incumbent's services, the markup of
price over marginal cost in inelastic markets is reduced by competition,
which increases the incumbent's elasticity of demand. The resulting re-
duction in the efficient price will probably be smaller if the entrants pos-
sess market power, because that will incline them to price above their own
marginal costs as well.
In short, the effect of competition on Ramsey prices depends on
whether entrants are also subjected to price regulation and whether they
possess market power. For the most part, regulators have chosen not to
regulate the prices of entrants in telecommunications, for good reasons.
This regulatory abstention, in conjunction with the observed concentration
of entry in long-distance markets, suggests that competition has had the
effect of reducing the (second-best) efficient prices for interexchange call-
ing and (since the deficit must be made up somewhere) increasing the
Ramsey prices for services sold in less competitive markets. This reason-
ing reinforces our observation that the present pattern of pricing is ex-
tremely inefficient.
There are alternative systems of second-best pricing capable in princi-
ple of producing results superior to those produced by Ramsey principles.
Ramsey pricing assigns one and only one price to each service, and
148. This can be seen most clearly by considering a multi-product monopoly confronting a per-
fectly inelastic demand curve in one market. If marginal cost pricing produced inadequate revenue,
the monopoly could capture the additional necessary revenues by increasing its price for the service
whose market demand is perfectly inelastic, thus avoiding any distortions in customers' choices. But
competitive entry into that market will limit the extent to which the incumbent can profitably increase
its price in that market, and thus may require it to increase its prices in other markets where (because
market demand is not perfectly inelastic) pricing above marginal cost does induce distortions. This
problem is asymmetrical in the sense that, if pricing services at marginal cost produced excessive
revenues, competition would not prevent the incumbent from selling services for which demand is
inelastic for well below marginal cost. See also Damus, Ramsey Pricing for U.S. Railroads: Can It
Exist?, 18 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL. 51 (1984).
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represent the most efficient solution consistent with that ground rule. A
two-part tariff, in contrast, charges customers a fixed fee for the option of
taking any service at all, and an additional, separate charge for each unit
actually purchased. A multi-part tariff introduces additional steps, pricing
different blocks of usage at different levels: declining block rates for elec-
tricity are a familiar example. So, if first-best rates for telephone service
produced inadequate revenue, one could price some initial block of calls
well above marginal cost, with the rates for additional blocks descending
progressively to that first-best level.
The reason for the potential superiority of these more complex systems
is that the additional prices allow marginal consumption to be priced
closer to marginal cost than Ramsey principles would permit, with the
revenue deficit made up by the inframarginal price-the fixed fee or the
price for the initial usage block or blocks. Thus, the problem of insuffi-
cient (or excess) revenue can be dealt with more efficiently by concentrat-
ing the necessary departures of price from marginal cost where they are
less likely to affect demand: a service covered by the fixed charge or the
price for some initial block of usage is likely to be demanded in any event.
A two-part tariff might indeed achieve first-best results. This would be
the outcome, for example, of pricing toll calls at marginal cost and using
the lump sum charge to make up the revenue deficit-but only in the
unlikely event that the fixed fee did not discourage some customers from
making long-distance calls altogether.
If, as seems more likely, the best a two-part tariff could produce is
second-best pricing, some additional benefit could probably be achieved by
introducing multi-part usage rates. Suppose, for example, that the margi-
nal cost of long-distance calls is five cents, and the price under the best
achievable two-part tariff is ten cents. If the largest customer demands one
hundred calls at that price, the telephone company could safely create a
three-part tariff by introducing a price slightly below ten cents for calls in
excess of one hundred per month. The lower price would cause the largest
customer (and probably others as well) to increase their calling; and the
additional calls, all priced above marginal cost, would bring in additional
profits, which could be used to reduce the prices for the preceding usage
blocks closer to marginal cost. Clearly a good deal of welfare-enhancing
consumption, inefficiently discouraged by Ramsey prices and simple two-
part tariffs, could in principle be elicited in this way, and second-best
would come closer to first-best.
In practice, however, these more sophisticated pricing schemes could be
less efficient than Ramsey pricing. They require substantially more
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information to calculate the second-best price levels. 49  Which
system-Ramsey pricing or multi-part tariffs-would be superior on bal-
ance is therefore ambiguous. This uncertainty does not, however, justify
the scant attention that has been paid to the possible use of multi-part
tariffs for telecommunications services.
If multi-part tariffs were to prove superior to Ramsey prices, it would
not change in any fundamental way our conclusions about the directions
in which the current telecommunications price structure should be re-
formed. It would still almost certainly be imperative to reduce toll and
local usage charges from their current, egregiously inflated levels and to
raise access prices.' 60 This strong conclusion must confront three possible
reservations, to which we turn, all of which suggest the possible desirabil-
ity of pricing subscriber access below its marginal costs.
B. Second-Best Pricing of Complementary Products
The Ramsey inverse elasticity rule does not apply without revision to
situations in which the demands for two or more of the services in ques-
tion are complementary,' 6 ' as of course are the demands for mere access
to the telephone office, on the one side, and for local and long distance
calling, on the other. This consideration was presented to one of us,
naively but perceptively, by a regulator, who asked how we reconciled our
advocacy of raising the basic monthly charge to recover the full non-
traffic-sensitive costs of subscriber access with the practice by most shop-
ping malls of not charging people for parking their cars, choosing instead
to recover the costs of providing that facility in the prices of the goods and
services purchased in the stores.
There are indeed circumstances when first-best pricing is not feasible
and some of the products or services are complementary, under which the
second-best alternative is to price below marginal cost the one that gives
149. Formulating Ramsey prices requires information on characteristics of market demands.
Multi-part tariffs require as well information on how demands for telephone services vary among
individuals.
150. A multi-part tariff might, however, involve not only much greater reductions than Ramsey
prices in the high usage blocks, but higher prices for the initial blocks of calls, if demand for them
were sufficiently inelastic-to such a degree as to justify a lower price for access as well. In this way,
these tariffs might extract from the initial usage blocks some of the revenues that Ramsey prices
would obtain from the access charge. On the other hand, the demands of low volume long-distance
callers, whose marginal rates would fall within the initial, high-priced blocks, are likely in our view to
be more elastic than the demand for subscriber access generally.
Manifestly, there is insufficient information available to permit a conclusion about how great a
difference there would be in the price structures under these two pricing schemes. One promising
application of the multi-part concept would be in the pricing of local service: subscribers could be
offered a choice of LMS schemes, one with a low access charge and a high price for an initial block of
calls, others with the opposite configuration.
151. See Baumol & Bradford, supra note 142.
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access to the others and recover the revenue deficiencies on the basis of
usage or purchases of the others. The logic is not difficult to grasp intui-
tively. The goal of second-best, when marginal cost pricing produces inad-
equate revenue, is to minimize the uneconomic discouragement of con-
sumption resulting from prices above first-best levels, by discriminating
among customers on the basis of their willingness to pay. Where services
A and B are complementary, it becomes necessary to consider the effect of
the markups on each on purchases of the other-that is, their cross-
elasticities of demand.
Specifically, pricing access to a shopping mall (or amusement park"')
at or above marginal cost may discourage purchases that are worth more
to customers than their combined marginal cost, including the marginal
cost of access. And it is possible that pricing the goods or services in the
shops (or the features at the amusement park) above their marginal costs,
while providing entry or parking below marginal cost, would cause less of
a distortion. Here, as in the simpler Ramsey case of independent de-
mands, the solution is to exact the necessary revenue contribution above
marginal cost from customers in proportion to their willingness to pay-in
this case in proportion to the value each customer places on the combined
service. This value can be measured by the extent to which the customer
is willing to pay separately for actually using the facilities-admission to
the individual attractions, or purchases at the stores.""
Whether this reasoning justifies the present system of pricing subscriber
access and usage is an empirical question, whose answer depends on the
relevant elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand for access and for use.
Specifically, usage would have to be comparatively highly sensitive to the
admission fee-the basic monthly charge-so that setting the latter at or
above marginal cost would do more economic damage than overpricing the
former. While the respective elasticities in the telephone case might well
have justified low basic monthly charges in the past, in order to encourage
widespread subscribership and use of the system, it seems highly unlikely
that they continue to do so today. Even large increases in the basic charge
today are unlikely to cause more than a small percentage of subscribers to
drop service; moreover, as we will point out, most of that attrition can be
prevented at far lower cost than is entailed by the present arrangement."'
152. See Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q.J.
ECON. 77 (1971).
153. Observe the similarity of this practice to the use of tie-ins as a counting device, to which we
have already referred, supra at note 32.
154. For a similar judgment to the effect that, telephone service having become something close to
a necessity of modern living, the historic economic benefits of pricing subscribership below marginal
costs are now far outweighed by the costs of overpricing usage, see A. Phillips, Welfare Aspects of
Telecommunications Services: Externalities and Related Issues (June 1, 1985) (unpublished
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C. Subscribership Externalities Revisited
Although in a first-best world the external benefits of subscribership
would call for a basic monthly charge below marginal cost, this would, in
a second-best world, produce inefficiencies far grosser than the one it is
intended to correct. Suppose those benefits were indeed worth three dol-
lars a month per marginal subscriber. First-best pricing would-
roughly "-require a monthly service charge to all hundred million or so
subscribers three dollars below marginal cost and, it appears, much fur-
ther below revenue requirements, in order to make certain that not a sin-
gle subscriber discontinued service the total marginal benefit of whose re-
maining on the system equalled or exceeded marginal cost. This alone
would produce a revenue deficiency of about 3.5 billion dollars annually,
which would have to be recovered from much more highly demand-elastic
usage, at an immense net loss in social welfare.
The inefficiency of such a "solution" is further highlighted by two addi-
tional considerations. First, losses of external benefits consequent on pric-
ing access at or above marginal cost would not be large in the aggregate,
because relatively few subscribers would in fact drop the service in re-
sponse to even quite large increases in the flat monthly charge. And, sec-
ond, there are far less costly ways of keeping those relatively few subscrib-
ers on the system-for example, direct subsidies or subsidized rates
targeted at low-income subscribers.
D. Income-Distributional Considerations.
Whether either government or the telephone company has some respon-
sibility to hold down the basic residential charge is unlikely to be decided
on the basis exclusively of economic efficiency considerations. Instead, it
will continue to be made very largely on the basis of more broadly politi-
cal considerations-in both the best and the most vulgar sense.
Economists universally recognize that moving from one set of prices to
another will have different effects on different people, and they accept the
relevance of those income-distributional consequences in deciding whether
such a change is socially desirable. Our colleague, Lewis Perl, has at-
tempted to estimate the effects of moving toward marginal cost pricing of
telephone services on households with various levels of income." 6 He
found that while it would produce very large social welfare gains, in the
manuscript on file with the authors).
155. In fact, a non-discriminatory charge three dollars below marginal cost would err in the oppo-
site direction, for the reason we have already given: it would encourage some subscriptions the margi-
nal benefits of which (internal and external) fell short of marginal cost. See supra note 122.
156. See L. Perl, supra note 38.
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aggregate, the lowest third of the population in income would actually
suffer a decline in welfare, and about eighty percent of the benefits would
flow to the highest-income third. This was so for essentially two reasons.
First, the principal upward correction of price would be a uniform in-
crease in the basic monthly charge to all families, a burden inversely pro-
portional to income. Second, the principal downward correction would be
a sharp reduction in the present overcharging of long-distance calling. A
large share of the present burden is borne by businesses and probably
shifted to consumers, who bear the burden more or less in proportion to




The possibility that more efficient prices will have unfortunate income
distributional consequences does not, however, suffice to justify the present
economically irrational price structure, and the enormous social welfare
losses that it entails. It requires us, rather, to seek ways of forestalling or
reversing those consequences that would be less costly than the present
system. The answer is of course the same as the solution to the problem of
externalities: direct subvention of the relatively small number of low-
income subscribers, in order to cushion them from the injury they would
suffer from efficient pricing.
157. The reader will observe that we do not include, as a third reason, that higher-income fami-
lies spend a larger proportion of their income on such calls than do families in more modest circum-
stances. While this is widely believed to be the case, in fact the evidence is by no means clear. See the
various estimates of income elasticities in L. TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 169-74.
The AT&T Long Line FIRM Model, whose results were not available at the time Taylor's book
was published, estimates an income elasticity of 0.63 for interstate MTS messages in 48 states and
Washington, D.C. This means that as income rises, expenditures on long-distance calling rise less
than proportionally. The following statistics of intrastate toll calling in Oklahoma by families of dif-
ferent income levels support this finding:
Intrastate Call
Annual Income Minutes Per Month
0 - $10,000 37.4
S10,000 - $20,000 47.9
S20,000 - S30,000 66.1
$30,000 - 340,000 57.4
Over $40,000 61.8
Average 49.9
Figures provided by Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for the year 1982.
These figures suggest that families of progressively higher income levels actually spend a declining
proportion of their income on intrastate toll calls.
Similarly, Satellite Business Systems (which was acquired by IBM in 1985), in its submission to
the Federal Communications Commission in Docket No. 78-72, observed that the average monthly
bills of the rural subscribers served by telephone companies receiving assistance from the Rural Elec-
trification Administration ranged from $20.41 in North Carolina to $58.85 in Alaska; the flat rates
for local exchange service fell in the six to eight dollar range. The difference between these figures, it
observed, demonstrates that people in rural areas, often of very modest means, make many inter-
exchange calls, precisely because of their comparative isolation.
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The total subsidy would not have to be large; it would be required for
only a small percentage of households. Since it is highly unlikely to be
forthcoming out of general revenues, what would be the least inefficient
way of raising it within the industry? As the logic of the foregoing discus-
sion clearly establishes, by far the (second-) best solution would be a
slightly elevated basic monthly service charge to all the other families
and/or business subscribers.
Conclusion
The emergence of competition in telecommunications markets has led to
strident disagreements about the prices that continue to be regulated.
Some disagreements are over the applicable pricing principles; but many
turn out, on close examination, to involve instead contentions about the
nature of telephone company costs, the range of services the companies
offer, and whether the companies are minimizing their costs, particularly
of "basic service." The only measures of cost germane to efficient prices
are the marginal costs that the company will actually incur in supplying
its full panoply of services, and its aggregate revenue requirement. Accu-
rate estimates of these costs are vital, and armchair empiricism is no sub-
stitute for engineering and statistical studies. Minimizing cost and offering
customers a suitable array of services and service qualities are important
objectives, but they are independent of the issue of how services should, in
principle, be priced.
The introduction of extraneous issues into these controversies is particu-
larly unfortunate because the pricing issues themselves are already suffi-
ciently complex; fallacious statements of economic principle only confuse
matters more. It is only in the simplest of circumstances that it is efficient
to price at marginal cost. The rule does not apply to telecommunications
markets for three reasons: the "network externality," the likelihood that
marginal cost pricing would not provide the firm with adequate revenue,
and the administrative cost of literally pricing every service at its marginal
cost. When a departure from marginal cost pricing is necessitated by the
company's revenue requirement, the objective becomes one of finding the
set of prices that minimizes the resulting distortions, either through Ram-
sey prices or multi-part tariffs. The network externality, by itself, makes
it efficient to depart from marginal cost pricing in order to provide indi-
viduals with suitable encouragement to connect to the network. And since
the costs of many telecommunications services vary from one moment to
the next and also from one customer to another, the administrative costs of
strict marginal cost pricing would be prohibitive.
Balancing these considerations is not easy. We do, however, have a
clear idea of the directions in which prices should be moved. Whatever the
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historic justification for the system of pricing still in effect today, it has
long since disappeared. Its social cost today is to be reckoned not merely
in terms of a multi-billion dollar annual static welfare loss, but, perhaps
even more important, in the ways in which it has discouraged the ex-
ploitation of one of our most dynamic, versatile technologies. The residual
need served by it can be achieved in other ways at only a small fraction of
that cost. The former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and his colleagues have provided us with an apt summary of our
argument:
The public switched network is a critical national resource that has
been underutilized because of inefficient pricing . . . . [Tihe key ob-
jective for public interest regulation in the transitional marketplace
should be to stimulate use of the public switched network to the effi-
cient levels that would be attained in a competitive marketplace.' 58
The economic principles we have elucidated point the way to achieving
that objective.
158. Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, supra note 8, at 166.
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